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Access to adequate housing is one of the greatest challenges facing the South African 
government today.1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Introduction 
Access to adequate housing2 is an important socio-economic right and is of central 
importance for the enjoyment of all rights3. The right to access adequate housing is 
viewed as a fundamental human right and has been described in both International 
Law and by the South African courts as being essential to the dignity of human beings.4 
Access to adequate housing thus plays an important part in ensuring human dignity 
for all persons. It is also one of the key elements needed to ensure that all persons 
have access to an adequate standard of living.  
Access to adequate housing further plays a vital role in maintaining and improving the 
lives of all people as it provides both security and shelter.5 In modern day South Africa, 
access to adequate housing is held in very high regard. This is evident in the 
recognition it has received in the National Development Plan as two of the fourteen 
outcomes of the plan are to ensure that “all people are and feel safe” and “sustainable 
human settlements and improved quality of household life.” 
                                                          
1 Chenwi L ‘Putting Flesh on the Skeleton: South African Judicial Enforcement of the Right to Adequate Housing 
of those Subject to Evictions’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 105 105. 
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Section 26 provides for a right to access adequate housing. 
However, the United Nations Committee have in their general comments spoken about a right to housing. 
3 In this mini-thesis any reference to socio-economic rights always includes reference to housing rights and the 
right to access adequate housing. 
4 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at para 
83. 
5 Ebadolahi B ‘Using Structural Interdicts and the South African Human Rights Commission to achieve judicial 
enforcement of economic and social rights in South Africa’ (2008) 83 New York University Law Review 1565 
1567. 
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The drafters of the South African Constitution recognised the importance of access to 
adequate housing as provision was made for the right to access adequate housing in 
the Final Constitution in section 26.6 
In considering the report submitted by South Africa, the United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural rights indicated (hereinafter referred to as the 
“Committee on ESCR”) the housing landscape in South Africa continues to be divided 
as a result of the past and that the apartheid spatial divide continues to dominate the 
landscape.7 Viljoen notes that despite numerous attempts to transform the housing 
regime from one which was grossly discriminatory to a welfare-orientated legal system 
that functions under the auspices of the rights and values entrenched in the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa the poorest households in South Africa 
remain subject to not only a lack of access to housing but also intolerable housing 
conditions.8 He writes further that the judicial enforcement of the right to access 
adequate housing is a difficult, complex and multi-layered issue with which the courts 
have been grappling for some time.9 
An examination of the housing rights jurisprudence reveals that housing rights and 
access to adequate housing has been one of the most fiercely contested and 
frequently litigated topics in the country.10  The jurisprudence also shows that housing 
is an area where much legislative, policy and infrastructure progress has been made. 
                                                          
6 The content of section 26 and what the right to adequate housing entails is discussed in Chapter 3 below. 
7 Government of the Republic of South Africa Initial Report of South Africa (2017) 11. 
8 Viljoen S ‘The Systemic Violation of Section 26(1): An Appeal for Structural Relief by the Judiciary’ (2015) 30 
SAPL 42 43. 
9 Viljoen S ‘The Systemic Violation of Section 26(1): An Appeal for Structural Relief by the Judiciary’ (2015) 30 
SAPL 42 44. 
10 Royston L, Molopi E & Budlender J ‘A place for the poor? Realising the right to adequate housing in 
Johannesburg’ available at https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-07-29-a-place-for-the-poor-realising-
the-right-to-adequate-housing-in-johannesburg/#.WQXk7PmGPIU (accessed on 30 April 2017). 
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However, while the legislative framework as well as the jurisprudence around housing 
rights and the right to access adequate housing is extensive and progressive, the 
reality is that many South Africans still do not have access to adequate housing. Pillay 
writes that rampant homelessness and inadequate housing in South Africa raise the 
question of the extent to which the state has adhered to the constitutional imperative 
to progressively realise the right of access to adequate housing.11 
Due to the nature of housing rights and that the realisation thereof requires the taking 
of positive action, housing rights can thus be included into a category which 
Liebenberg describes as positive socio-economic rights in that in order for housing 
rights to be realised, positive conduct needs to be taken.12 Wesson adds to this and 
notes that housing rights are a key component of the Constitution’s transformative 
agenda inasmuch as they impose redistributive obligations on the state to take positive 
action.13 As will be shown below the realisation of the right to adequate housing is not 
a simple process and includes access to sufficient basic services, materials, facilities 
and infrastructure as well as ensuring that the occupants are given security of tenure. 
Furthermore having access to adequate housing involves more than simply having a 
dwelling, but rather having somewhere to live in peace, with security, privacy.14  
However despite being seen as a positive right, housing rights have both negative and 
positive obligations attached to it. The positive obligations lie in that states are obliged 
to take action which will lead to the progressive realisation of the right. While the 
                                                          
11 Pillay K ‘Implementation of Grootboom: Implications for the enforcement of socio-economic rights’ (2002) 6 
Law Democracy and Development 255 256. 
12 Liebenberg S The Interpretation of Socio-Economic Rights in Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed (2005) 
33-1. 
13 Wesson M ‘Reasonableness in Retreat? The Judgment of the South African Constitutional Court in Mazibuko 
v City of Johannesburg’ (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 390 391. 
14 Chenwi L ‘Putting Flesh on the Skeleton: South African Judicial Enforcement of the Right to Adequate 
Housing of Those Subject to Evictions’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 105 105. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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negative obligation focuses on the notion that housing rights should not be violated in 
any way and can only be taken away by an order of court made after considering all 
the relevant circumstances.15  
Muller in commenting on the right to access adequate housing states that “facilitating 
the progressive realisation of the right to adequate housing takes place in a vacuum.”16  
He notes further that as a result of the courts favouring the reasonableness approach, 
this has led to a failure to engage in a substantive analysis of the content of the right 
of access to adequate housing and the obligations which flow from this right.17  
It will be argued in this mini-thesis that the failure of the court to engage in a 
substantive analysis on the right to access adequate housing has resulted in very little 
substantive content being created around what constitutes adequate housing. This 
has moreover resulted firstly, in litigants not getting the assistance which they sought 
from the court and secondly, future litigants not having any real precedent to follow or 
any substantive content to give regard to when pursuing their right to access adequate 
housing. 
Muller states that by providing substantive content to the right to access adequate 
housing this will lead to government having a clear benchmark from which it can 
ensure the progressive realisation of the right to access to adequate housing and also 
will provide the public with a standard against which the government can be held 
accountable.18 
                                                          
15 For more on this please see the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 below. 
16 Muller G ‘Proposing a way to develop the substantive content of the right to access adequate housing: An 
Alternative to the reasonableness review model’ (2015) 30 SAPL 71 72.  
17 Muller G ‘Proposing a way to develop the substantive content of the right to access adequate housing: An 
Alternative to the reasonableness review model’ (2015) 30 SAPL 71 76.   
18 Muller G ‘Proposing a way to develop the substantive content of the right to access adequate housing: An 
Alternative to the reasonableness review model’ (2015) 30 SAPL 71 73.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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In January 2015, the South African government ended a close to 20 year wait when 
they ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“hereinafter referred to as the ICESCR or the Covenant”). Ratification refers to an act 
taken by a state in the international plane whereby it establishes its consent to be 
bound to a treaty.19 In ratifying the ICESCR so long after it was first signed, South 
Africa re-affirmed its commitment to the protection and the fulfilment of socio-economic 
rights.  
The ratification of the ICESCR also brings South Africa a step closer to the realisation 
of socio-economic rights.20 It is also important to note that the language used in and 
obligations contained in the Final Constitution to a large extent mirror the socio-
economic norms and standards of the ICESCR.21 The ratification of the ICESCR 
comes as a result of an extensive campaign by civil society aimed at ensuring the 
ratification of the ICESCR. The organisations who supported the campaign viewed the 
ICESCR as a treaty which was important for enforcing the rights of those living in 
poverty and that it was relevant to the majority of communities in South Africa, who do 
not have access to some of the most basic human rights. It was thus critical that South 
African Civil Society advanced the call for the State to ratify the ICESCR.22 
The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter 
referred to as “the Committee on ESCR”) have indicated that the socio-economic 
rights which are contained in the ICESCR are all fundamental human rights which are 
important to ensure that a human being lives a life of dignity and is able to develop 
                                                          
19 Europatientrights ‘SIGNING AND RATIFYING A TREATY’ available at 
http://europatientrights.eu/countries/signing_and_ratifying_a_treaty.html (accessed 8 May 2017). 
20 Government of the Republic of South Africa Initial Report of South Africa (2017) 4. 
21 Government of the Republic of South Africa Initial Report of South Africa (2017) 4. 
22 Dullar Omar Institute ‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)’ available at 
https://dullahomarinstitute.org.za/socio-economic-rights/international-covenant-on-economic-social-and-
cultural-rights-icescr (accessed 15 November 2017). 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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and that state parties must as far as possible comply with their obligations in terms of 
the ICESCR.  
The ratification of the ICESCR is a significant event for socio-economic rights in South 
Africa as it demonstrates the importance of socio-economic rights in South Africa and 
the role it plays in improving people’s lives. Mclaren notes that the ratification of the 
ICESCR binds South Africa to its provisions and brings new opportunities for ordinary 
citizens to shape and accelerate dialogue and actions towards the realisation of socio-
economic rights.23 Mclaren notes further that the ICESCR provides new opportunities 
for the government and civil society to explore what social and economic justice 
requires of us today.   
In addition to this, the ratification of the ICESCR also has the potential to kick start a 
second round of litigation around the right to access adequate housing as it opens 
doors for litigation not previously possible before ratification.  
Muller shortly after the ratification of the ICESCR writes that the ratification of the 
ICESCR by the South African government would make it difficult for the Constitutional 
Court to persist with the view that section 26(1) of the Constitution is distinct from 
article 11(1) of the ICESCR and that that post ratification, the time is ripe for the 
Constitutional Court to infuse its interpretative approach of section 26(1) of the 
Constitution with a more rigorous and substantive reading of the section which is 
grounded in international law.24  
                                                          
23 Mclaren ‘Ratification of Human Rights Treaty Reaffirms SA’s Commitment to Socio-Economic Rights and 
Internationalism’ available at http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/2264 (accessed 29 February 2016). 
24 Muller G ‘Proposing a way to develop the substantive content of the right to access adequate housing: An 
Alternative to the reasonableness review model’ (2015) 30 SAPL 71 72.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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The basis of Muller’s statement lies in the fact that international law makes reference 
to a minimum core standard for socio-economic rights. The Constitutional Court has 
however chosen to adopt a reasonableness approach instead of giving effect to the 
minimum core obligation when dealing with cases involving socio-economic rights.  
In addition to this, certain writers have also noticed that the Constitutional Court, in the 
pre-ratification era, has to some extent been reluctant to adjudicate cases where there 
is a complex dispute involving access to adequate housing. Roux states that the 
Constitutional Court has been somewhat conservative when adjudicating cases 
around access to adequate housing and states that “often the court made pragmatic 
decisions instead of decisions grounded in legal principle.  
Writing in 2018, Muller’s statement raises the question whether the Constitutional 
Court has made pragmatic decisions in certain cases in the past, and if so what were 
the reasons for this. It further raises the question whether in cases involving housing 
rights and the interpretation of the right to access adequate housing, the court has 
also chosen to avoid dealing with the issue at hand in a particular case and in doing 
so avoided providing substantive content to the right to access adequate housing.  
Muller’s statement then further raises the question whether three years post 
ratification, the time is still ripe for the Constitutional Court to change its interpretive 
approach to section 26(1) and bring it more in line with international law. This mini-
thesis looks to investigate Muller’s statement and also looks to test Muller’s premise 
by examining domestic law remedies which can be pursued in litigation post-
ratification of the ICESCR in order to determine whether the ratification of the ICESCR 
is enough to achieve what Muller is proposing or whether more still needs to be done. 
This mini-thesis also examines whether there are any international remedies available 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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post-ratification which South Africa should consider and what effect these international 
law remedies are likely to have. 
Therefore this mini-thesis uses Muller’s statement as a base and looks to examine 
what effect South Africa’s ratification of the ICESCR is likely to have on domestic 
remedies currently available and whether the ratification of the ICESCR can, through 
the use of strategic litigation, bring about a change in access housings rights and lead 
to an in access adequate housing. Muller notes that the burgeoning jurisprudence on 
the right to housing in international law provides a wealth of material which the 
Constitutional Court should consider in terms of section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution for 
purposes of developing the content of the right of access to adequate housing.25  
Wilson points out that litigation, although not successful in the courts, can still indirectly 
affect social change through the mobilisation which comes with both the preparation 
and the lead up to a case and the aftermath of a judgment being handed down.26 
Wilson thus endorses using rights and obligations as an instrument for progressive 
change and argues that constitutional rights and progressive jurisprudence provide 
authoritative statements of the public policy goals of a country. Furthermore when 
combining the South African Constitution with the current jurisprudence as well as the 
provisions of the ICESCR, this could lead to a change in the interpretive approach of 
the courts regarding the right to access adequate housing.27 
The ICESCR, as will be seen below has been relied upon by parties in legal argument 
and considered by courts in the past. However, at the time that those cases were 
                                                          
25 Muller G ‘Proposing a way to develop the substantive content of the right to access adequate housing: An 
Alternative to the reasonableness review model’ (2015) 30 SAPL 71 79. 
26 Wilson S ‘Litigating Housing Rights in Johannesburg’s Inner City: 2004 – 2008’ (2011) 27 South African 
Journal of Human Rights 127 129. 
27 Wilson S ‘Litigating Housing Rights in Johannesburg’s Inner City: 2004 – 2008’ (2011) 27 South African 
Journal of Human Rights 127 129. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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argued and those judgements were written, South Africa had not yet ratified the 
ICESCR. However since the ICESCR has now been ratified, its status has been 
upgraded and South Africa is now bound to its provisions as section 231(2) of the 
Constitution.28 
This mini-thesis will thus look to investigate whether in a pre-ratification era, the 
Constitutional Court failed to provide substantive content to section 26(1) and why and 
further whether three years post ratification the time is ripe for the Constitutional Court 
to infuse its interpretive approach of section 26(1) of the Constitution with international 
law. This will be done by way of testing the domestic remedies currently available in 
litigation to determine whether the ratification of the ICESCR is enough ensure that 
the Constitutional Court changes its interpretive approach, or whether more still needs 
to be done. 
1.2 Structure 
This mini-thesis will be divided into three main chapters which starts at chapter 2 and 
continues through until chapter 4. Chapter 5 is the conclusion. 
Chapter 2 is entitled the Right to Access Adequate Housing in the ICESCR and 
International Law. In this Chapter the focus is on the right to housing in international 
law. This chapter starts by looking at what the ICESCR is, its history and how it came 
into existence. Thereafter it examines the content given to the right to housing in the 
ICESCR and its supporting documents as well as the positive and negative obligations 
attached to housing rights. Chapter 2 continues with a discussion on the minimum 
core standard which has been adopted in international law and the emphasis given to 
this standard in international law. This chapter also looks at the provisions of the 
                                                          
28 Dugard J International Law – A South African Perspective 3ed (2010) 59.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
16 
 
ICESCR and its supporting documents and how these assist in explaining and giving 
content to the minimum core standard.  
Chapter 2 also includes an examination of the mechanisms available for the 
monitoring of and ensuring compliance with the provisions of the ICESCR. In this 
section, the reporting obligations of member states as well as the mechanisms 
available to ensure compliance with the ICESCR in terms of the Optional-Protocol and 
the African Charter are discussed. Chapter 2 also includes an examination of South 
Africa’s initial report and the feedback given at the 64th session of the Committee on 
ESCR which took place recently. 
Chapter 3 of this mini-thesis is entitled the role and place of the ICESCR in the housing 
rights jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court before ratification. The 
focus of this chapter is on South Africa and the South African Constitutional Court. 
This chapter starts with an examination of section 26 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa and examines the content and obligations of the right to access 
adequate housing provided by this section. After the discussion on section 26, this 
chapter looks at the place of the ICESCR in South African law post ratification with 
reference to section 39(1)(b) and section 233 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa.  
Chapter 3 then shifts its focus to the courts and an examination of the jurisprudence 
of the Constitutional Court is undertaken. Cases where the ICESCR has played a role 
are examined in order to determine what arguments were made regarding the ICESCR 
and also how the Constitutional Court viewed the ICESCR. 
The examination of the jurisprudence ties in with Muller’s statement that the 
Constitutional Court has been slow to heed its obligation to consider international law 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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when it interprets the right of access to adequate housing.29  Thus it is important for 
one to re-visit the current jurisprudence in order to determine whether Muller’s 
statement has any merit. Re-examining the jurisprudence will also enable one to 
determine whether the courts have played the role asked of them and done everything 
they could to give effect to housing rights and also added the necessary content to the 
right to access adequate housing.  
This chapter concludes with an examination of the reactions by academics and legal 
practitioners to the stance taken by the Constitutional Court regarding the ICESCR. 
An examination of the work of authors such as Brand, Bilchitz, Roux and Fowkes is 
undertaken to assist with this. These authors have noticed that a certain trend has 
emerged in judgments on cases involving socio-economic rights. This is examined in 
this chapter as well as the possible reasons for this. 
Chapter 4 is entitled the role and place of the ICESCR in the interpretation and 
enforcement of section 26 of the South African Constitution after ratification. This 
chapter starts by acknowledging Muller’s submission that the ratification of the 
ICESCR can represent a new start for the right to access adequate housing. In chapter 
4, Muller’s premise is tested through an examination of the domestic remedies which 
can be pursued through the courts post ratification. 
In Chapter 4 the concept of strategic litigation is introduced and discussed as it is 
through the use of strategic litigation that Muller’s premise can be tested. The 
remedies examined in this chapter looks to test the statement made by Muller that 
since the ratification of the ICESCR, the time is ripe for the Constitutional Court to 
infuse its interpretive approach with a more rigorous and substantive reading that is 
                                                          
29 Muller G ‘Proposing a way to develop the substantive content of the right to access adequate housing: An 
Alternative to the reasonableness review model’ (2015) 30 SAPL 71 73. 
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grounded in international law. In the discussion of these remedies, the relevant parties, 
causes of action, relief requested and the facts and evidence which should be alleged 
and proved will be examined while also the possible arguments which should be made 
are discussed. The purpose of this is to determine how pursuing these remedies in 
courts will likely play out post ratification and further to determine whether the 
ratification of the ICESCR is enough to ensure the change in interpretive approach 
which Muller is predicting. 
This chapter concludes with an examination of the international law mechanisms and 
remedies which are available post ratification and examines what role these remedies 
can play with regard to Muller’s premise and also in increasing access to adequate 
housing.  
This mini-theses will then conclude in chapter 5 where the entire journey will re-visited. 
The basis for the study and the route followed will be discussed as well as the 
significant events which became important points in the study will be highlighted. All 
which looks to respond to Muller’s statement that the ratification of the ICESCR by the 
South African government would make it difficult for the Constitutional Court to persist 
with the view that section 26(1) of the Constitution is distinct from article 11(1) of the 
ICESCR and that the time is ripe for the Constitutional Court to infuse its interpretative 
approach to section 26(1) of the Constitution with a more rigorous and substantive 
reading that is grounded in international law.30  
 
 
                                                          
30 Muller G ‘Proposing a way to develop the substantive content of the right to access adequate housing: An 
Alternative to the reasonableness review model’ (2015) 30 SAPL 71 72.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE RIGHT TO ACCESS ADEQUATE HOUSING IN THE ICESCR AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter a focus will be placed on the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter referred to as “the ICESCR”) and its supporting 
documents. The focus of this chapter will be two-fold. This chapter will first examine 
the content given to the right to access adequate housing in international law and then 
proceed to examine the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms currently in place 
to ensure compliance with the provisions of the ICESCR. In addressing the monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms, this chapter will conclude with a brief discussion on the 
report recently submitted by South Africa to the Committee on ESCR and the response 
received. 
In determining the content given to housing rights in international law, the ICESCR as 
well as the General Comments of the Committee of ESCR and other soft law 
instruments will be examined. The rationale behind choosing to examine these 
documents is given by Roux who writes that the Committee on ESCR, in its general 
comments, provided the best framework for the interpretation of socio-economic rights 
and that this framework could be incorporated in a future interpretation of the South 
African Constitution.31  
  
 
                                                          
31 Roux T The Politics of Principle (2013) 268. 
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2.2 The History and Origin of the ICESCR  
The ICESCR is a multilateral treaty which was adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly by the General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI) on 16 December 1966 
and came into operation on 3 January 1976.32 It reflects the commitments which were 
adopted after World War 2 to promote social progress and better standards of living.  
While this was the main goal of the ICESCR, the ICESCR also had the effect of 
reaffirming faith in human rights.33  
The ICESCR can thus be described as an international human rights treaty which 
creates legally binding international law obligations on those member states which 
have, through the ratification thereof, agreed to be bound by the standards and 
obligations contained in it. As of November 2006, around 155 states are parties to the 
ICESCR. The number of member states which have chosen to be bound by the 
provisions of the ICESCR is an indication of the global consensus which exists around 
international human rights standards.34 
Since being introduced in 1966, the ICESCR has been ratified by over 80 countries. 
Lotilla notes that the ratification by so many countries gives the ICESCR a firm status 
as an international instrument which gives rise to certain legal obligations.35 In the 
preamble the ICESCR provides that member states should promote respect for and 
the observance of universal human rights and freedoms. The ICESCR thus obliges 
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member states to adopt a wide range of legislative and policy measures to ensure the 
protection of individuals, groups and communities and also promote fundamental 
human rights. Member states are thus required to ensure that the socio-economic 
rights, which are grouped under the right to an adequate standard of living in the 
ICESCR, are promoted, realised and fulfilled. In relation to housing rights this involves 
ensuring that people are provided with access to housing which includes the 
necessary security of tenure to ensure protection against forced evictions.36   
The Preamble of the ICESCR provides that all member states recognise that all human 
beings are equal and possess certain inalienable rights. It further provides that all 
economic, social and cultural rights derive from the inherent dignity of a human being. 
It has also been noted that in order to achieve the ideal of free human beings, 
conditions must be created whereby everyone can enjoy their economic, social and 
cultural rights37 in addition to their civil political rights.38 
2.3 The Right to Access Adequate Housing - Adequate Housing in the ICESCR 
and International Law 
The right to housing is given effect to in Article 11(1) of the ICESCR and forms part of 
the right to an adequate standard of living. This article provides that: 
‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and  to the continuous improvement of living conditions. 
The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, 
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recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based 
on free consent.’39 
Thus, while housing is not specifically made provision for and protected in the 
ICESCR, it is protected as part of the adequate standard of living to which a person is 
entitled under the ICESCR. Grant writes that the right to housing is identified as an 
aspect of a more general right to an adequate standard of living in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and that article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights provides that: 
 ‘Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
 and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing and 
 housing’40 
Thus the right to adequate housing is of central importance for ensuring that everyone 
has an adequate standard of living and also for the enjoyment of all socio-economic 
rights.41 In paragraph 6, of General Comment 4, the Committee states that the right to 
adequate housing applies to everyone despite the fact that article 11 of the ICESCR 
makes reference to an adequate standard of living for “himself and his family”. The 
Committee notes that the concept of family must be understood in a wide sense and 
that the phrase used in the ICESCR cannot be read as implying any limitations upon 
the applicability of the right to individuals or female-headed households.42 
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It is in paragraph seven of General Comment 4 where the Committee on ESCR begins 
to link housing with the concept of having an adequate standard of living. Paragraph 
seven states that the Committee on ESCR does not view the right to housing narrowly 
but rather adopts a wide view which includes the right to live somewhere in security, 
peace and dignity.43 It notes that this wider view is the appropriate one as the right to 
housing is integrally linked to the other human rights, such as the right to human dignity 
and the principle of non-discrimination, and also to the fundamental principles upon 
which the ICESCR is premised. 
In addition to the above, the Committee on ESCR states that the concept of adequacy 
is significant when determining whether particular forms of shelter actually constitute 
adequate housing.44 It then goes on to list a number of factors which must be taken 
into account when determining whether adequate housing exists. These factors 
include legal security of tenure, availability of materials, services and infrastructure 
and habitability. Moreover, the United Nations in writing on the right to adequate 
housing, state that in order to be considered adequate, housing must provide more 
than four walls and a roof.45 They also provide that for housing to be considered 
adequate, the following criteria must be met; there must be security of tenure and 
services, materials, facilities and infrastructure must be available and the housing must 
not be located where people will be cut off from their employment or various services. 
Housing must also be affordable, habitable, accessible and culturally adequate.46  
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These factors are viewed as basics which need to be in place for housing to be 
considered adequate. It is here where the Committee on ESCR confirms that there 
are certain minimum factors which must be present when determining whether 
housing is adequate. These minimum factors which must be present is referred to in 
international law as the minimum core.  
2.4 The Minimum Core and The Right to Adequate Housing 
The minimum core standard is a concept introduced by the Committee on ESCR with 
the aim of ensuring “the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of 
each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party.” The minimum core concept 
aims to set a quantitative and qualitative floor of socio-economic and cultural rights 
that must be immediately realised by the state as a matter of top priority.47  
The minimum core obligation is spelled out in paragraph 10 of the Comment:  
‘On the basis of the extensive experience gained by the Committee, as well as by the body 
that preceded it, over a period of more than a decade of examining States parties' reports 
the Committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, 
at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every 
State party. Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number of individuals 
is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and 
housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its 
obligations under the Covenant. If the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to 
establish such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison d'être.’ 
Tasioulas writes that on the basis of the extensive experience gained by the 
Committee on ESCR over more than a decade of examining the reports of member 
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states, the Committee on ESCR is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure 
the satisfaction of minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon 
every state party.48 Grant adds to this and writes that in order to give content to the 
obligation of progressive realisation, members states must immediately provide a 
minimum core of each of the rights provided for under the ICESCR.49 
The existence of a minimum core standard is confirmed by the Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on Development based Evictions and Displacement which provides that as 
a minimum standard, access to adequate housing should include having safe and 
secure access to essential food, potable water and sanitation, basic shelter and 
housing.50 Regarding housing specifically, the minimum core includes, having access 
to a dwelling which offers both protection from the elements as well as privacy, having 
access to water, sanitation and refuse removal facilities. Katherine Young takes it one 
step further and links these minimum standards to human dignity and notes that 
certain interpretations of dignity are consistent with the protection of economic and 
social rights and affirms “that people who are denied access to the basic social and 
economic rights are denied the opportunity to live their lives with a semblance of 
human dignity.51 
Through the minimum core the Committee on ESCR seeks to set a minimum content 
for socio-economic rights and establish a minimum standard that must be realised by 
member states.52 The minimum core concept has also been recognised on a regional 
level by the African Commission in Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation 
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of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights although here the emphasis is placed on the minimum duties of a state as 
opposed to minimum essential levels of a right.53 Fowkes writes that the minimum core 
represents a bid to respond to socio-economic scepticism and to the conviction that 
socio-economic rights will not be enforceable until they have concrete content.54 
The minimum core is accepted as a standard in international law and refers to the 
obligation on states to ensure that no significant number of individuals are deprived of 
the “minimum essential levels” of socio-economic rights.55 Wesson writes that the 
minimum core entails that socio-economic rights generate a minimum level of 
provision that a member states should realise as a matter of priority and that it serves 
as the starting point for progressive realisation.56 The minimum core standard flows 
from the premise that a basic minimum level of subsistence is required for the 
enjoyment of a dignified human existence.57  
2.5 Taking Appropriate Steps to Ensure Progressive Realisation 
Article 2 of the ICESCR provides that each member state is required to take steps 
which are aimed at achieving the progressive realisation of the rights contained in the 
ICESCR.58 Grant writes that the Committee on ESCR has distinguished between 
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obligations of conduct and obligations of result and that both come into play in 
determining whether a member state has fulfilled its obligations under article 2.59 
General Comment 3 deals with the nature of the obligations of member states, and 
provides that article two of the ICESCR describes the nature of the general legal 
obligations undertaken by member states to the ICESCR.60 Article 2 must thus be 
viewed as having an active relationship with the other provisions of the ICESCR. 
Article 2(1) of the Covenant provides that: 
“each State Party undertakes to take steps, individually and through international 
assistance and co-operation and to the maximum of its available resources, with 
a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in 
the present Covenant and that this including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures.”61  
 
Tasioulas writes that the principle reflected in article 2(1) is to take steps with a view 
to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the ICESCR 
and that the failure of a member state to take steps constitutes a contravention on the 
part of that member state.62 
The Committee on ESCR however also notes that certain obligations need to have an 
immediate effect. According to Liebenberg, upon ratification of the ICESCR, a member 
state is under an obligation to begin immediately taking steps aimed towards the full 
realisation of the rights contained in the ICESCR and that such steps should be 
deliberate, concrete and targeted towards meeting the obligations recognised by the 
                                                          
59 Grant E Enforcing Social and Economic Rights: The Right to Adequate Housing in South Africa (2007) 6. 
60 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) ‘General Comment No. 3: The Nature of 
States Parties' Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant), 14 December 1990, E/1991/23’ available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838e10.html (accessed 14 November 2018). 
61 UN General Assembly ‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3’ available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c0.html  (accessed 21 November 2018). 
62 Tasioulas J Minimum Core Obligations: Human Rights in the Here and Now (2017) 13. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
28 
 
ICESCR.63 Alston and Quinn add to this and write that the key point is that the 
undertaking to take steps is of immediate application and that in this respect the 
ICESCR imposes an immediate and readily identifiable obligation upon state parties.64 
Thus, while the full realisation of housing and other socio-economic rights may be 
achieved progressively, steps geared towards that goal must be taken either 
immediately or within a short time after ratification.65 Examples of such steps will 
include adopting the ICESCR into domestic law or instructing Parliament to start a 
legislative process geared towards doing so.  
Paragraph 3 of the Committee on ESCR’s General Comment 3 states that the steps 
taken by member states should involve all appropriate means and that this includes 
the adoption of legislative measures.66 Thus the Committee on ECSR recognises that 
legislation plays an important part in ensuring access to housing and other socio-
economic rights.  
This obligation is confirmed by the Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter referred 
to as “the Limburg Principles”). The Limburg Principles provide that: 
 ‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
 through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, 
 to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the 
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 full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all  appropriate 
 means.’67  
De Visser adds to this and notes that the obligation to promote fundamental rights 
means that member states must encourage and advance the realisation of these rights 
and that the obligation to fulfil fundamental rights means that the state must take 
appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial and other measures towards 
their realisation.68  
Article 25 ties in with this and provides that member states are obligated to ensure 
minimum subsistence rights for all.69 Bilchitz writes that the United Nations Committee 
on ESCR has held that socio-economic rights contain a minimum core obligation that 
must be fulfilled by member states and that such an obligation requires every member 
state to fulfil certain essential levels of the right in question and that a failure to do so 
constitutes a prima facie failure by a member state to discharge its obligations under 
the ICESCR.70   
 
Chenwi writes that the ICESCR and the South African Constitution are instruments 
which recognise that socio-economic rights have to be realised over time.71 She 
argues further that meeting the essential minimum levels of the rights is an initial step 
towards progressive realisation.72 Liebenberg notes that when interpreting whether 
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there has been compliance by the government, the courts should be concerned to hold 
the government accountable for meeting essential minimum levels of each of the rights 
in the ICESCR as required by the Committee on ESCR and recommended in the 
Limburg Principles.73 
2.6 Within Available Resources 
Chenwi writes that the ICESCR recognises that socio-economic rights have to be 
realised over time and the progress towards full realisation is dependent on the 
availability of resources.74  Liebenberg writes that the obligation of progressive 
realisation is qualified by phrase to the maximum of its available resources and that 
this qualification recognises the reality that the extent of fulfilment of the rights 
contained in the ICESCR will depend on the financial capacity of the member state.75 
Thus while the ICESCR provides for the progressive realisation of the right to housing 
and other socio-economic rights, it also acknowledges the constraints which exist due 
to the limitation of available resources. Alston and Quinn note that most of the rights 
granted depend in varying degrees on the availability of resources and this fact is 
recognised and reflected in the concept of "progressive achievement or progressive 
realisation”.76 However, while the Committee on ESCR acknowledges that resources 
constraints may be an obstacle to member states meeting their obligations, the 
obligation remains on the member state to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of 
the relevant rights.  
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Currie and De Waal note that resource scarcity does not relieve member states of the 
minimum core obligations and that violations will occur when the member state fails to 
satisfy obligations to ensure the satisfaction of the minimum essential levels of the 
right.77 
2.7 Negative Obligations with regard to Housing Rights 
While housing rights are mainly viewed as positive rights, it also comes with negative 
obligations. The negative obligations are centred on that existing housing rights should 
not be violated and that member states should ensure that this does not happen. 
In International law the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (hereinafter referred to as the “Maastricht Guidelines”) provide further 
content to the negative obligation attached to housing rights and links the negative 
obligations around housing rights to obligations of member states to respect and 
protect housing rights and access to housing. 
The obligation to respect requires member states to refrain from interfering with the 
enjoyment of housing and other socio-economic rights.78 Respecting individuals and 
communities housing rights requires member states to refrain from performing, 
sponsoring, or tolerating any practice, policy or measure which violates the integrity of 
individuals or infringes upon their use and enjoyment thereof. It further requires 
member states to refrain from engaging in any conduct which will have a negative 
effect on an individual or a community’s access to and enjoyment of their rights.  
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The obligation to protect socio-economic rights requires member states to prevent the 
violation of socio-economic rights by third parties.79 This entails that member states or 
their agents have to ensure that the socio-economic rights of an individual or a 
community are not violated by any individual or non-state actor. Where a third party 
does violate the socio-economic rights of an individual or a community, the obligation 
to protect requires member states to guarantee access to remedies, both legal and 
otherwise, for the violation. 
2.8 Reporting Obligations under the ICESCR 
Articles 16 and 17 contain the reporting obligations of member states under the 
ICESCR. Liebenberg writes that the supervision of the obligations of member states 
is done through a system of periodic reporting by member states on the measures 
they have adopted and the progress they have made in achieving the observance of 
the rights recognised in the ICESCR.80 Article 16 of the ICESCR requires member 
states to undertake to submit in conformity with this part of the ICESCR reports on the 
measures which they have adopted and the progress made in achieving the 
observance of the rights recognized herein.81 
The reports contain the progress made by the particular member state and also 
indicate the factors and difficulties faced by the particular member state in fulfilling 
their obligations under the ICESCR. 
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Liebenberg writes further that the system presently in force requires member states to 
submit its initial report within 2 years of ratifying the ICESCR and thereafter member 
states are required to report at 5 year intervals.82 The Committee examines the reports 
at public meetings to which the reporting member state sends representatives to 
answer questions relating to and debate issues around the report. 
 
 2.9  South Africa’s Initial Report and the Issues Raised at the 64th   
 Session of the Committee on ECSR 
 
South Africa’s initial report was due in 2017 and was received by the Committee on 
ESCR on 25 April 2017. In its initial report, South Africa acknowledged that acceding 
to the ICESCR represented an important step forward in ensuring the realisation of 
socio-economic rights and that the ratification of the ICESCR will continue to deepen 
the enforcement of socio-economic rights in the country.83 
In addressing policies strategies and legislation in the initial report, the South African 
government acknowledged that the state is compelled to respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil the range of socio-economic rights as a matter of obligation.84 Furthermore, 
the South African government also acknowledged that the core socio-economic rights 
impose positive obligations on the state to take reasonable legislative and other 
measures to ensure that the entitlements promised by the rights are progressively 
achieved.85 In addition to this, the South African government further acknowledged in 
their initial report that “municipalities must ensure that the right to housing is realised” 
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and that the municipality must identify and designate land for housing and ensure that 
water, sanitation, electricity, roads, storm water drainage and transport are provided.86 
In the list of issues in relation to the initial report of South Africa, the Committee on 
ESCR raised various issues regarding the right to housing and requested information 
on the measures taken to enhance coordination between the national, provincial and 
local governments in providing housing with basic services, the measures taken to 
ensure that evictions are carried out in accordance with relevant domestic laws and 
international human rights standards and also information on the obstacles being 
faced in improving access to safe drinkable water and adequate sanitation facilities.87 
In response to the issues raised by the Committee on ESCR regarding housing rights 
and access to adequate housing, the South African government in their reply 
confirmed that that there are currently measures in place to provide assistance to 
households in obtaining mortgage finance to acquire residential property.88 It also 
noted that service delivery has stagnated recently due to the problems experienced in 
rolling out those services in densely populated and volatile areas and further that 
obtaining land from its rightful owners, rezoning it and planning service delivery options 
are proving to be challenging.89 
The initial report of South Africa was considered by the Committee on ESCR at the 64 
session which took place from 24 September 2018 to 12 October 2018. Introducing 
the report, John Jeffery, Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development of 
South Africa, said that the Covenant was a major source of influence for the inclusion 
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of economic, social and cultural rights in the national Constitution.90 He further 
emphasised the value of the Covenant was that it helped the Government to measure 
whether its domestic laws, policies and programmes complied with its international 
obligations. The Government found that the Covenant was making a difference in the 
realisation of socio-economic rights in the country, and it was of the view that the 
Covenant was not static but a living document and that the value of the Covenant was 
that it helped the Government to measure whether its domestic laws, policies and 
programmes complied with its international obligations.91 It should also be noted that 
one of the issues raised at the session was access to adequate housing and it was 
acknowledged that with regard to housing and other socio-economic rights a lack of 
domestic enforcement mechanisms do exist. 
2.10 Enforcement Mechanisms under the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
It is important to note that despite ratifying the ICESCR, the South African government 
has not ratified the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter referred to as “the OP-ICESCR”). Viljoen and 
Orago note that in ratifying the ICESCR the government have shown a commitment 
to the realisation of socio-economic rights. However in the same breath they state that 
post ratification the question becomes one of adding enforcement mechanisms to the 
                                                          
90 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
considers the report of South Africa’ available at 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23683&LangID=E (accessed 16 
October 2018). 
91 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
considers the report of South Africa’ available at 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23683&LangID=E (accessed 16 
October 2018). 
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already accepted standards.92 It is here where the OP-ICESCR comes in at it contains 
the enforcement mechanism necessary to ensure compliance with the ICESCR. 
The accession to the OP-ICESCR by the South African government would thus be a 
crucial step for the enforcement of the right to access adequate housing. Viljoen and 
Orago state that accession to the OP-ICESCR would be of great benefit to South Africa 
as it would provide an additional safety net in instances where persons whose rights 
have been violated have not been able to get recourse at the domestic level as the 
OP-ICESCR provides additional international law mechanisms for rights violations. 
The OP-ICESCR provides the procedures which the victims of rights violations must 
follow, the reporting obligations of member states and creates the possibility that the 
Committee on ESCR can of their own accord institute inquiries into member states. In 
addition to this, the OP-ICESCR also mandates the Committee on ESCR to receive 
and consider communications from individuals of groups of individuals who are victims 
of the violation of any socio-economic right contained in the ICESCR from state parties 
who have ratified or acceded to the OP-ICESCR.93 
Viljoen and Orago note that South Africa’s accession to the ICESCR is likely to ensure 
constitutional, legislative and policy conformity with South Africa’s international socio-
economic rights obligations. They also acknowledge that while South Africa has put in 
place an extensive range of mechanisms for the protection and promotion of socio-
                                                          
92 Viljoen F & Orago N ‘An Argument for South Africa’s Accession to the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Light of its Importance and Implications’ (2014) 17 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal  2554 2575. 
93 Viljoen F & Orago N ‘An Argument for South Africa’s Accession to the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Light of its Importance and Implications’ (2014) 17 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal  2554 2558. 
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economic rights at the national level,94 there are instances where these domestic 
mechanisms fail to adequately or effectively protect rights and that when this occurs 
access to an international mechanism provides an essential procedure victims of 
socio-economic rights violations can access to remedy the violation or contravention.95 
 
2.11 Enforcement Mechanisms Under the African Charter  
South Africa both signed and ratified the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights (hereinafter referred to as “the African Charter”) on 9 July 1996.96 While through 
the ratification of the African Charter the South African government recognises that 
fundamental human rights stem from the attributes of human beings and recognised 
its duty to protect and promote human and people’s rights.97 South Africa has failed to 
put in place a mechanism to achieve or enforce this.  
The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, in article 1 
establishes an African Court Human and Peoples` Rights (hereinafter referred to as 
“the African Court”). Articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights provides that the African Court shall complement the protective 
mandate of the African Commission and that the jurisdiction of the Court shall extend 
to all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application 
of the Charter, this Protocol and any other relevant Human Rights instrument ratified 
by the States concerned. 
                                                          
94 Viljoen F & Orago N ‘An Argument for South Africa’s Accession to the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Light of its Importance and Implications’ (2014) 17 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal  2554 2577. 
95 Viljoen F & Orago N ‘An Argument for South Africa’s Accession to the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Light of its Importance and Implications’ (2014) 17 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal  2554 2577. 
96 African Commission of Human and People’s Rights ‘Ratification Timetable: African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights’ available at http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ratification/ (accessed 13 June 2018). 
97 Preamble to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights  
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However, despite having signed and ratified the African Charter, South Africa has 
failed to pass a declaration in terms of Article 34(6) of the Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and People’s Rights which would empower the African Court to allow and hear 
complaints lodged by non-governmental organisations with observer status before the 
commission as well as hear and decide on complaints brought by individuals or groups 
of individuals. 
 
2.12 Conclusion  
The ratification of the ICESCR by the South African government reaffirms the 
government’s commitment to the protection, promotion and realisation of socio-
economic rights. Moreover, the ratification of the ICESCR has the potential to breathe 
new life into the effort to ensure that everyone has access to adequate housing. 
One of the effects of the ratification of the ICESCR is that it provides a new 
international law standard around housing rights. As we have seen in this chapter, 
housing rights and the right to access adequate housing has been given extensive 
content in international law and that the minimum core standard has been adopted in 
both international law and in the ICESCR. This minimum core standard provides clear 
guidelines as to what is considered as adequate housing and what minimum standard 
must be complied with. 
In this chapter we saw that South Africa has complied with its initial reporting 
obligations under the ICESCR and that access to adequate housing was highlighted 
as an issue which requires attention. This Chapter however revealed that at present, 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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South Africa does not have many mechanisms available to ensure compliance with or 
enforce the provisions of the ICESCR.  
This Chapter further indicated that mechanisms are available in international law but 
that the South African government would need to take certain steps in order for these 
mechanisms to be applicable in South Africa. In its concluding observations on the 
initial report of South Africa the Committee on ESCR encouraged South Africa to ratify 
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.98 
The acknowledgement by the South African government at the 64th session of the 
Committee on ESCR that the access to adequate housing remains an issue is an 
indication that the past should be revisited and that the status quo should be 
reconsidered. As the executive have taken a step in ratifying the ICESCR, one now 
needs to determine whether the judiciary has played its role and whether post 
ratification more can be done. In Chapter 3 the judiciary’s stance with regard to socio-
economic rights cases and also their views on the ICESCR will be examined. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
98 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Concluding Remarks on the Initial Report of South Africa 
(2018) 13. 
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CHAPTER THREE   
THE ROLE AND PLACE OF THE ICESCR IN THE HOUSING RIGHTS 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
BEFORE RATIFICATION  
3.1 Introduction 
In spite of the prominent place the right to adequate housing had assumed in 
international human rights law by the start of the 1990’s,99 the interim Constitution of 
South Africa which was drafted in 1993 did not include any reference to article 11(1) 
of the ICESCR or the right to adequate housing.100 It was only when section 26 of the 
Final Constitution came into operation on 4 February 1997, that South Africans could 
finally also lay claim to this internationally recognised right. The section has an 
interesting drafting history.101  
Section 26 was not yet in force when the ICESCR was signed by former President 
Mandela but was drafted and finalised during 1996 with the knowledge that the 
ICESCR had been signed. It is also significant that former President Mandela signed 
the ICESCR at a time that the content of the Final Constitution had not yet been 
finalised and it could even be argued that Mandela signed the ICESCR in order to 
bolster the case for the inclusion of such a right in the so-called “final” Constitution. As 
we will see, despite the Technical Committee strongly supporting the international law 
position during the draft process, the final text of section 26 deviated from the 
                                                          
99 See chapter two above. Recall that the Committee on ESCR had by then issued General Comment 3 
(December 1990) and General Comment 4 (December 1991). 
100 For a discussion of the background to the inclusion of the right in the 1996 Constitution see Roux 265-273. 
Roux points out that the ANC’s Draft Bill of Rights (1990) accepted that the international law approach under 
the ICESCR provided the best framework for the protection of social rights (270).   
101 In S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para 25 the Court ruled that the undisputed drafting history of 
the Bill of Right may be considered when the right is interpreted.    
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international law formulation.102 Roux writes that the Technical Committee took the 
view that there were certain advantages to be had in following the ICESCR 
formulation. These advantages being that adopting the ICESCR formulation would 
help to harmonise South Africa’s international and domestic obligations and that the 
General Comments of the Committee on ESCR would provide a steady source of 
guidance on how social rights ought to be interpreted.103 
Whatever the case might be, section 26 of the Constitution reads as follows:   
‘26(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
26(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of this right. 
26(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home 
demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the 
relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary 
evictions.’104 
 
The inclusion of section 26 in the Final Constitution was widely supported and rightly 
celebrated at the time by academics and legal practitioners alike. Motala and 
Ramaphosa write that the right to access adequate housing had to be included in the 
Final Constitution as the right to access adequate housing cannot be seen in isolation 
and should be viewed as having a close relationship with other socio-economic 
rights.105  
                                                          
102 Roux T The Politics of Principle (2013) 270. 
103 Roux T The Politics of Principle (2013) 270. 
104  Section 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
There are three important differences between the formulation of the right in article 11 of the ICESCR and in 
section 26 of the Bill of Rights: (i) the inclusion of the word “access” before “adequate housing” in the Bill of 
Rights; (ii) the duty to take “reasonable” as opposed to “appropriate” measures in the Bill of Rights; and (iii) 
the inclusion of the latter duty immediately after the right in the same section of the Bill of Rights. 
105 Motala and Ramaphosa Constitutional Law Analysis and Cases (2002) 395. 
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As is clear from the text, the right to access adequate housing contains both positive 
and negative obligations. These obligations are given effect to in terms of section 7(2) 
of the Bill of Rights which provides that the state has the constitutional duty to “respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil” all the rights contained in the Bill of Rights.106 
The positive obligations are set out in sections 26(1) and 26(2) and form the focus of 
this mini-thesis.107 In addition to the positive obligations the right to access adequate 
housing also comes with negative obligations which are contained in section 26(3) of 
the Constitution. Grant writes that section 26(3) is freestanding and is not subject to 
the qualifications attached to the general right.108 As indicated in chapter 2 above, the 
negative obligation encompasses a duty to respect, protect and not violate existing 
housing rights.109 
Currie and De Waal write that section 26(3) expressly entrenches a conventional 
negative right and that this right protects against the eviction of persons or the 
demolition of a person home without a court order.110 An example of a failure to respect 
housing rights would be the arbitrary forced eviction of an individual or a community 
from their homes. The significance of the negative obligation within the context of 
housing rights was emphasised in Jafta v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz111 where 
the court emphasised that the negative duty is not subject to qualifications of 
subsection (2) such as reasonableness, resource constraints and progressive 
                                                          
106 Section 7(2) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
107 In Dladla and Another v City of Johannesburg and Others 2018 (2) SA 327 (CC) it was argued by the amicus 
curaie at para 29 that the right to adequate housing is recognised in international human rights law as a self-
standing right. Cameron J at para 64 however held that “The three parts of section 26 must be read and 
understood together”.  
108 Grant E Enforcing Social and Economic Rights: The Right to Adequate Housing in South Africa (2007) 16. 
109 Please see discussion in section 2.7 above. 
110 Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6ed (2015) 587. 
111 Jafta v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC), 2005 (1) BCLR 78 (CC) at para 39.  
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realisation and further held that a violation of this negative duty constitutes a violation 
of the right which can only be justified in terms of the limitations clause.112 
Viljoen writes that the question of whether the right to access adequate housing is 
justiciable is uncontested. Fowkes takes it a step further and writes that the idea that 
the state has the obligation to provide housing enjoys very substantial public status in 
South Africa.113 However, despite this the judicial enforcement of the right to access 
adequate housing is a difficult issue which the courts have struggled with.114 As the 
case law discussed in this chapter will indicate, the Constitutional Court has struggled 
to come to terms with the positive obligations contained in section 26 and that the 
question as to what constitutes adequate housing still remains unanswered. 
 Muller’s hypothesis is that after the ratification of the ICESCR in 2015, the time is ripe 
for the Constitutional Court to infuse its interpretive approach of section 26 of the 
Constitution with a more rigorous and substantive reading of international law.115 In 
setting the basis for this statement, Muller notes that the Constitutional Court has failed 
to properly engage with the substantive content of section 26(1) and that this lack of 
engagement can be attributed to the interpretive approach that the court adopted and 
the strong reliance which the Constitutional Court places on the reasonableness of the 
measures adopted by the government.116  
                                                          
112 Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 215. 
113 Fowkes Building the Constitution The Practice of Constitutional Interpretation in Post-Apartheid South Africa 
(2016) 246. 
114 Viljoen S ‘The Systemic Violation of Section 26(1): An Appeal for Structural Relief by the Judiciary’ (2015) 30 
SAPL 42 44.  
115 Muller G ‘Proposing a way to develop the substantive content of the right to access adequate housing: An 
Alternative to the reasonableness review model’ (2015) 30 SAPL 71 73. 
116 Muller G ‘Proposing a way to develop the substantive content of the right to access adequate housing: An 
Alternative to the reasonableness review model’ (2015) 30 SAPL 71 72. 
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The aim of the rest of this chapter is to assess the merits of Muller’s critique. The focus 
thus shifts to the right to access adequate housing in South Africa as interpreted by 
the Constitutional Court in the era before the ratification of the ICESCR. This chapter 
investigates how the ICESCR was presented to the Constitutional Court pre-
ratification and the views adopted by the Constitutional Court towards the ICESCR. 
The chapter ends by looking at how various writers, academics and legal professionals 
reacted to the stance taken by the Constitutional Court towards the ICESCR.  
The case law and literature on the subject is vast.117 Given the scope of this mini-
thesis, it is impossible and unnecessary to explore all the finer nuances between cases 
and authors around the issue. Muller claims that the ratification of the ICESCR will 
compel the Court to adopt a new housing rights jurisprudence. Therefore this chapter 
deals selectively with the case law and literature only in as far as it is necessary to 
confirm or dispel his hypothesis. To test his hypothesis, it is first necessary to 
understand the Court’s interpretation of section 26 in broad terms and the reasons 
why this interpretation was adopted.  
 3.2  International law as an Interpretive Aid 
President Mandela’s signing of the ICESCR under section 82(1)(i) of the interim 
Constitution did not commit South Africa to ratify the ICESCR under section 231(2) of 
the interim Constitution, nor did it place an obligation on South Africa to immediately 
comply with its terms. Under article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, a signatory to a Convention is nevertheless “obliged to refrain from acts 
which would defeat the object and purpose” of the Convention “until it shall have made 
                                                          
117 Cases include Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC); Government of 
the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another 69 2012 (2) SA 104 CC and Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). 
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its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty”.118 South Africa is not a party to 
the Vienna Convention, but article 18 is widely regarded as a rule of customary 
international law.119 This means that the article 18 obligations applied to South Africa 
under section 231(4) of the interim Constitution and 232 of the Constitution but that 
the ICESCR was not binding international law as far as South Africa was concerned. 
Interestingly enough, this was not a decisive factor when it came to the interpretation 
of the positive obligations imposed on the state by section 26(1).  
In S v Makwanyane the Court considered the role and importance of international law 
in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights under section 35(1) of the interim Constitution 
(the almost identical predecessor of section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution).120 The Court 
stated:  
‘Customary international law and the ratification and accession to international agreements is 
dealt with in section 231 of the Constitution which sets the requirements for such law to be 
binding within South Africa. In the context of section 35(1), public international law would 
include non-binding as well as binding law. They may both be used under the section as tools 
of interpretation.’121 
 
Applied to the interpretation of section 26, this principle of comparative interpretation 
means that the ICESCR had to be considered under section 39(1)(b) when the 
Constitutional Court set out to interpret the content of the right to access adequate 
housing for the first time. 
In the chapter below I briefly explore whether and how the Court complied with this 
interpretive injunction in the period before the ratification of the ICESCR. Before doing 
                                                          
118 Article 18 11. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with annex), 1969 (1969) 8 ILM 679. 
119 Palchetti P ‘Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention: A Vague and Ineffective Obligation or a Useful Means 
of Strengthening Legal Cooperation?’ in Cannizarro E (ed) The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention 
(2011) 25 26.  
120 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 35.  
121 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 35. 
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so, the precise nature of the obligation needs to be clarified in a little more detail. 
Having just interpreted the meaning of “international law” broadly, to also include non-
binding international law, the Court in S v Makwanyane immediately pulled back on 
the potentially radical implications of this interpretation. The court held that:122  
‘In dealing with comparative law, we must bear in mind that we are required to construe 
the South African Constitution, and not an international instrument […], and that this has 
to be done with due regard to our legal system, our history and circumstances, and the 
structure and language of our own Constitution. We can derive assistance from 
public international law and foreign case law, but we are in no way bound to follow it.’ 
 
In this passage the Court essentially summarised the method of constitutional 
interpretation that Du Plessis and Corder,123 and Botha,124 describe as the holistic, 
comprehensive, inclusive and contextual method of purposive interpretation. When 
interpreting the meaning of the right to have access to adequate housing, the Court 
thus had to undertake a grammatical, systematic, purposive (teleological) and 
comparative analysis of section 26. This means that the Court had to carefully consider 
(i) the wording and the differences between the formulation of the right in the 
Constitution and the ICESCR; (ii) the internal structure of section 26 together with the 
cluster of surrounding socio-economic rights with which it is associated; (iii) the 
purpose behind the inclusion of the right and the constitutional values which the right 
is said to operationalise; and (iv) the interpretation of the same right in international 
human rights law. In the end, what is required is the “judicious interpretation and 
assessment of all these factors to determine what the Constitution permits and what it 
prohibits”.125 
                                                          
122 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 29. 
123 Lourens du Plessis and Hugh Corder Understanding South Africa’s transitional Bill of Rights (1994) 73-74. 
124 Botha C Statutory interpretation: An introduction for students 5ed (2012) 111; 192. 
125 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 266 (per Mahomed J). 
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As the next section shows, this inclusive approach to constitutional interpretation 
placed the text of article 11 of the ICESCR at the centre of the debate about the scope 
and content of section 26.  
3.3 Interpreting the scope and content of section 26 
The cases discussed below are examples of cases where the provisions of the 
ICESCR and its supporting documents were considered by the Constitutional Court in 
terms of the Makwanyane approach to constitutional interpretation. The purpose of 
examining these selected cases is to get an indication of how the ICESCR was 
presented to the Constitutional Court and also how the Constitutional Court viewed 
the ICESCR in the pre-ratification era. For this purpose it is not necessary to look 
beyond the judgments in Grootboom and Mazibuko.126  
Both cases dealt with the positive obligations of socio-economic rights. In both cases, 
either the parties to the litigation or the amicus curaie argued for the adoption of the 
minimum core standard of international human rights law and that compliance with the 
positive obligation should be measured against the minimum core standard of 
international human rights law.127  
In both cases, the hearings were held and the judgments were handed down before 
the ratification of the ICESCR in 2015. The first case discussed deals specifically with 
the right to access adequate housing (Grootboom), and the second case deals with 
                                                          
126 In the pre-ratification era, the ICESCR was referred to in the following cases namely: Jaftha v Schoeman and 
Others, Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) at paras 23 and 24 (right to access to adequate 
housing).  Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School & Others v Essay N.O. and Others (CCT 29/10) 
[2011] ZACC 13; 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC) (11 April 2011) at para 40 (in the context of education).  
Union of Refugee Women and Others v Director, Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority and Others (CCT 
39/06) [2006] ZACC 23; 2007 (4) BCLR 339 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 537 (CC); 2007 (4) SA 395 (CC) at para 138 (in the 
context of the right to work). 
Motswagae and Others v Rustenburg Local Municipality and Another (CCT 42/12) [2013] ZACC 1; 2013 (3) BCLR 
271 (CC); 2013 (2) SA 613 (CC) at para 12. 
127 See the discussion in Chapter 2 above. 
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socio-economic rights more broadly and the right to have access to sufficient water in 
particular (Mazibuko).  
The views of the court will provide a base from which Muller’s premise of whether, 
after the ratification of the ICESCR, the time is ripe for the court to adopt a new 
interpretive approach towards section 26(1) which is more line with international law 
can be tested. 
 
3.3.1  Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and 
Others 
Perhaps the most famous case regarding housing rights is Government of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others128. This matter is 
referred to by Wesson as being the most significant case involving socio-economic 
rights ever decided by the Constitutional Court and one which laid the basis for the 
future adjudication of socio-economic rights issues.129  
 
In this matter, a group of people living in a suburb on the outskirts of Cape Town were 
rendered homeless as a result of being evicted from private land which had been 
earmarked for formal low-cost housing. The group applied to the High Court to order 
the Municipality to provide them with basic shelter (tents, portable latrines and 
transported water) this being the minimum core obligation protected by section 26(1) 
of the Constitution. The applicants relied heavily on the ICESCR as interpreted in 
General Comment 3 and the Limburg Principles as discussed in chapter 2 to support 
their interpretation of section 26(1) as a right to access to basic shelter.  
                                                          
128 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
129 Wesson M ‘Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the Socio-Economic Jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court’ (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 284 285. 
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The High Court (per Davis J) dismissed the application in as far as it rested on section 
26(1).130 The Court held that the Municipality had introduced a rational housing 
programme and that section 26(1), read in context with section 26(2), and in light of 
the historical context and economic realities of post-apartheid South Africa, did not 
entitle Mrs Grootboom to be provided with free shelter on demand.131 The High Court 
nevertheless provided some relief to Mrs Grootboom as a parent of her child, based 
on section 28 or the best interest of the child principle.132 The Court ordered that the 
government should provide shelter to the children and their parents and specified that 
tents, portable latrines and a regular supply of water would constitute a bare minimum 
of what should be provided for the residents.133 
The Municipality thereupon appealed against the decision of the High Court to the 
Constitutional Court. The latter Court upheld the appeal in part but, unlike the High 
Court, found that the housing policy of the Municipality violated section 26(2) because 
it did not include reasonable measures to provide shelter for “people who have no 
access to land, no roof over their heads, and who are living in intolerable situations 
and crisis conditions”.134 In a separate order, the Court ordered the Municipality to 
provide the applicants with permanent toilets, permanent taps, and building material 
to the value of R760 each with which to waterproof their existing accommodation on 
the Wallacedene sports field.  
The Court (per Yacoob J) unanimously confirmed the finding of the High Court that 
section 26(1) is not a free-standing right which entitles every right bearer to be 
                                                          
130 Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C). 
131 Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C) at para 7. 
132 Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C) at para 22. 
133 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at para 
16. 
134 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at para 
99. 
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provided with a minimum level of housing or shelter on demand. However, the Court 
disagreed with the High Court that the housing policy of the Municipality was a 
“reasonable measure” within “available resources” to achieve the “progressive 
realisation” of access to adequate housing in that it “failed to provide relief to those 
desperately in need of access to housing”.135  
It is the first aspect of the judgment that is of relevance here. The Court confirmed the 
Makwanyane approach to the interpretation of constitutional rights and set out to 
interpret the scope and content of section 26(1) in its textual and socio-historical 
context.136 The Court also confirmed that “relevant international law can be a guide to 
interpretation but the weight to be attached to any particular principle or rule of 
international law will vary”.137 The rest of the judgment provides a striking example of 
this varied reliance on international law. Read on its own, the wording of section 26(1) 
seems to confer an unqualified right to have access to adequate housing. This 
includes a negative obligation not to be deprived of existing access;138 a right 
reinforced by the anti-eviction and demolition provisions of section 26(3). The key 
terms are “access” and “adequate”. In line with the jurisprudence under the ICESCR, 
the Court held that the latter term recognises that housing entails more than brick and 
mortar. However, the inclusion of the word “access” marks a “significant” difference 
between the Constitution and the ICESCR. 139 This difference is deepened by that fact 
                                                          
135 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at para 
95. 
136 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at para 
22. 
137 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at para 
26. 
138 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at para 
34. 
139 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at para 
28.  
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that section 26(2) speaks about “reasonable” measures and the ICESCR about 
“appropriate steps”.140  
The crux of the Court’s interpretation is that section 26(1) and section 26(2) must be 
read together.141 The varied reliance on the ICESCR is again evident here. The Court 
relies heavily on the ICESCR to give content to section 26(2) and the concept of 
“progressive realisation”,142 stating that the concept was derived from the ICESCR and 
that “there is no reason not to accept that it bears the same meaning in the Constitution 
as in the document from which it was so clearly derived”.143 In so-doing the Court 
accepted the interpretation provided in paragraph 9 of General Comment 3 as 
authoritative. This fact makes the Court’s rejection of paragraph 10 of the same 
General Comment all the more remarkable. As discussed in chapter 2, this paragraph 
establishes that the right to adequate housing contains a core substantive content or 
minimum essential level. The Court was urged to also adopt this aspect of international 
law as authoritative and to define the core content or the minimum level of shelter to 
which section 26(1) entitles every person in South Africa. 
The amici curiae, using the provisions of the ICESCR as a basis, made the argument 
that the minimum core obligations for housing as laid out in the international law 
treaties and supporting documents should be given effect to. The legal representatives 
on behalf of the amici curaie presented argument which contended that all the 
respondents, including those of the adult respondents without children, were entitled 
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to shelter in line with and by reason of the minimum core obligation incurred by the 
state in terms of section 26 of the Constitution.144 It was then argued further on behalf 
of the amici curaie that article 11.1 of the ICESCR is of significance when 
understanding the positive obligations created by socio-economic rights in the 
Constitution and that article 11.1 must be read with article 2 of the ICESCR.145 
The amici relied on the relevant general comments issued by the Committee on ESCR 
concerning the interpretation and application of the ICESCR, and argued that these 
general comments constitute a significant guide to the interpretation of section 26. In 
particular they argued that in interpreting this section, we should adopt an approach 
similar to that taken by the committee in paragraph 10 of general comment 3 issued 
in 1990, in which the committee found that socio-economic rights contain a minimum 
core.146 It was then argued further that it is clear from this extract that the Committee 
on ESCR considers that every state party is bound to fulfil a minimum core obligation 
by ensuring the satisfaction of a minimum essential level of the socio-economic rights, 
including the right to adequate housing.147  
The court noted that the minimum core is the floor beneath which the conduct of the 
state must not drop if there is to be compliance with the country’s international 
obligations.148 The Constitutional Court, however, controversially adopted the view 
that the right delineated in section 26(1) is a right of access to adequate housing and 
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is distinct from the right to adequate housing encapsulated in the ICESCR and that the 
difference in formulation is significant.149 As such the Court declined the invitation and 
preferred to decide the case on the basis of the reasonableness of the housing policy 
before it.  
Does this mean that the Court rejected the minimum core concept, or merely that it 
preferred not to rely on the minimum core to make its decision on this occasion? The 
difference is of little practical significance if the Court consistently refuses to define the 
minimum core of the right in all cases (as it has done), but the former seems to be the 
better interpretation. The Court rejected the idea that section 26(1) is a free-standing 
right with its own substantive core. There are also indications that, in as far as the 
Court is willing to entertain the idea of a minimum core, that it will only be as part of 
the reasonableness test “to determine whether the measures taken by the state is 
reasonable”.150 The Court deals extensively with the minimum core obligation imposed 
by the ICESCR, but Yacoob J presents numerous reasons why the Court is not in a 
position to define the minimum core of the right to have access to adequate housing. 
The first is that the General Comment itself does not “specify precisely” what that 
minimum core is.151 Second, it is complex if not conceptually impossible to determine 
the minimum content in a society marked by deep divides between urban and rural, 
and different economic levels in society.152 Third, the Court lacks the experience and 
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information gained by the Committee over more than a decade of examining Reports 
submitted by State parties.153  
The Grootboom thus indicates how the Constitutional Court viewed the ICESCR and 
the minimum core in relation to housing rights and the right to access adequate 
housing. We see a court embrace the existence of a minimum core standard but 
choose not to directly apply it. In the Mazibuko case discussed below, we see a court 
having to answer similar questions but in a different context. 
3.3.2 Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 
More recently, the issue of the minimum core again came before the courts in 
Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others154 (“the Mazibuko case”) 
which centered around the first attempt to litigate a case on the right of access to 
sufficient water in terms of section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution. In this matter, the 
Applicants continued their pursuit for the adoption of the minimum core standard as 
provided for in international law. In this case, the Constitutional Court was thus invited 
to revisit its stance on the minimum core and was also requested to define the content 
of the right to water. 
In this matter, the Applicants challenged the City’s free water policy arguing that it was 
insufficient and constituted an infringement of their right to access water as well as 
their right to dignity and equality.155 The Applicants furthermore asked the court to 
determine whether a quantified amount of water could be considered as sufficient 
water.156  
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As in previous cases argument was made for the adoption of the minimum core and a 
basic, minimum amount of water which must be provided, as laid out in the ICESCR 
and the general comments.157 It was argued that every social and economic right has 
a minimum core or a basic content which must be provided by the state and that in 
international law the view is that a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction 
of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon 
every state party.158 
As in the Grootboom case, the court looked at the relationship between section 
27(1)(b) and section 27(2) of the Constitution.159  In making reference to the 
Grootboom case and the TAC case and in applying the same interpretive approach 
used, the court held that “Section 27(1) of the Constitution does not give rise to a self-
standing and independent positive right enforceable irrespective of the considerations 
mentioned in section 27(2)”.160 
The court then, in applying the interpretive approach to section 27(1)(b) of the 
Constitution, held that it is clear that the right does not require the state to provide 
every person with sufficient water on demand and that it requires the state to take 
reasonable legislative and other measures to progressively achieve access to 
sufficient water within available resources.161 
While noting the arguments made in favour of the minimum core in the Grootboom 
case as well as the TAC case, the court in the Mazibuko case again rejected the 
application of the minimum core approach stating that courts are ill-suited to adjudicate 
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upon issues where Court orders could have multiple social and economic 
consequences for the community. The court also further held that it is institutionally 
inappropriate for a court to determine precisely what the achievement of any particular 
social and economic right entails and what steps government should take to ensure 
the progressive realisation of the right.162  
The court did however note that the state has an obligation to respond to the basic 
needs of the people and by doing so the rights in the Bill of Rights will acquire 
content.163 It held further that if government takes no steps to realise the rights, the 
courts will require the government to take steps.164 These two statements have left the 
door open for the minimum core standard to be tested in a court law post ratification 
of the ICESCR. As post ratification the minimum core standard now binds South Africa 
in international law and in cases where the basic needs of people have not been 
responded to or the government has taken no steps to realise rights, the courts will 
intervene and require the government to take steps. 
The judgment in the Mazibuko case might look like another loss in the argument for 
the use of the minimum core approach in cases involving access to socio-economic 
rights. However, a reading of the last paragraph of the judgment as well as looking at 
the circumstances in which we currently operate reveals that there is still much hope. 
O Regan J, in concluding her judgment, noted that while litigation around socio-
economic rights is expensive and requires great expertise, in South Africa there exists 
an expertise in litigating for the interests of the poor to the great benefit of society. She 
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notes further that while the challenges in litigation of this nature are significant, but 
given the benefits it can offer, it should be pursued.165 
The cases discussed above leave many questions unanswered and many issues have 
not been address. As a result of the stance taken by the Constitutional Court in these 
cases, the judgments have also elicited a mixed reaction from legal practitioners and 
legal academics. In the next section, an examination of the reaction of members of the 
legal profession is undertaken.  
3.4 Academic reactions to the Jurisprudence 
3.4.1 Grootboom as a flight from doctrine: Brand and Bilchitz  
Roux writes that there is a divergence of opinion in the academic literature on the 
Chaskalson Court’s social rights jurisprudence with the court’s reluctance to adopt the 
minimum core approach receiving the most attention.166  
In cases involving the right to access adequate housing, the minimum core standard, 
as discussed and set out in Chapter two above, is the one favoured in international 
law. Brand in referring to Michelman writes that with the minimum core or the minimum 
protection approach, one is able to approach the evil of poverty as if it were composed 
on complex deprivations which can be solved by creating a society which places 
emphasis on everyone’s basic needs and looks to address this.167  
However, the approach taken by the Constitutional Court was one dominated by the 
reasonableness standard. Fowkes writes that the Court’s reasonableness test is 
commonly taken as the symbol of what is wrong with its socio-economic rights 
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jurisprudence and is further seen as a symptom of its failure to take these rights as 
seriously as other types of rights.168 In the context of access to adequate housing, the 
Constitutional Court chose to rather than impose upon the state a minimum core 
obligation which must be complied with, adopt the standard of reasonableness which 
within it has the obligation to cater to people in desperate need as an essential 
element.169 Brand writes that in doing so, the Constitutional Court has proceduralised 
the adjudication of socio-economic rights170 and that when dealing with socio-
economic rights cases the court is concerned with the structure of good governance 
rather than the deprivation and alleviation of need.171   
 
Steinberg writes that the Constitutional Court’s adoption of the reasonableness 
paradigm is integrally linked to its interpretation of section 26.172 She writes that the 
reasonableness approach “strikes a balance between the need to ensure that 
constitutional obligations are met, on the one hand, and recognition for the fact that 
the bearers of those obligations should be given leeway to determine the best way to 
meet the obligations in all circumstances”.173 Roux notes that one of the key features 
of the reasonableness approach is its flexibility.174 It is this flexibility which makes the 
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reasonableness approach ideal when faced with the complex legal and social issues 
which housing rights and ensuring access to adequate housing are characterised by. 
Supporters of the reasonableness approach argue that the courts’ limited institutional 
competence might result in judges getting it wrong and that defining the minimum 
content of rights should be recognised as a specialised policy making exercise to 
which the process of adjudication is not well suited.175 Roux, when commenting on the 
Grootboom case, writes that in its judgment, the Constitutional Court rather than 
imposing a minimum core obligation; prioritise the reasonableness standard. This 
makes the state’s obligation to cater to people in desperate need and not to exclude 
a significant segment of society, an essential requirement of reasonableness.176 
Bilchitz however argues that this was the wrong decision and that the court 
misunderstood what its role in defining the minimum core required.177 Despite 
argument from the amici curaie to adopt the minimum core, the court rejected the 
minimum core as a standard for determining the access to adequate housing. The 
argument was rejected on the basis that access to housing was conditioned by varying 
needs and opportunities for the enjoyment of the right and that this was an issue which 
the court had little knowledge of and thus the court was not in a position to offer a 
determination of the minimum core.178 Bilchitz however argues that the court simply 
needed to state in general terms what the universal standard for the satisfaction of the 
minimum core obligation was, as the court itself conceded that the minimum core had 
been developed on the back of extensive experience.179  
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Bilchitz also criticises the judgment in the Grootboom case for confusing principle and 
policy. He argues that the court failed to draw a crucial distinction between the 
universal standard that must be met in order for an obligation to be fulfilled and the 
numerous particular methods that can be adopted to this standard.180 He further states 
that the minimum core could provide a useful guideline to courts when faced with 
cases such as the Grootboom case and that the notion of progressive realisation does 
not exempt states from immediately providing at the minimum survival needs of its 
population under all circumstances.181  
Brand writes that in its adjudication of socio-economic rights cases, the Constitutional 
Court fled from substance and he describes this as the court taking a thin approach.182 
He writes further that one of the practical effects of this approach is that it will limit the 
creative use of litigation to effect social change and further that it discourages people 
without housing from approaching the courts for relief on the basis of their socio-
economic rights.183 
In response to these writers, Roux states that the court’s real objection to the minimum 
core approach had more to do with the long-term institutional consequences of 
adopting this understanding of its mandate and that the stance taken by the court 
depended on managing its relationship with the ANC as they were set to govern for 
some time.184 
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3.4.2 Grootboom as strategically compromising doctrine: Roux 
Another aspect of the academic critique of the Grootboom case discussed above is 
that the Court had failed to give the right to have access to adequate housing sufficient 
substantive content or the correct substantive content. For these critics, the attraction 
of the ICESCR is that it provides the right with the correct content and could thus be 
latched upon to end the Court’s “flight from substance”. The critics of the Court’s 
substantive jurisprudence are generally not convinced by institutional or separation of 
powers concerns.  
Many academics write that it was through the use of strategic adjudication and 
concepts such as minimalism, judicial deference and judicial avoidance that the 
Constitutional Court was able to avoid providing substantive content for socio-
economic rights. Supporters of the this line of thinking argue that through the use of 
strategic adjudication the court can in certain cases avoid making decisions or make 
pragmatic decisions, which took into account the circumstances around the case, as 
opposed to making strictly principled decisions grounded in law.    
Young writes that judicial avoidance or deference involves courts choosing not to 
make a particular decision and deferring it to, in most cases, another branch of 
government or avoiding to decide a hotly contested legal issue by choosing to instead 
deal with an apparently more straightforward legal argument.185 Young notes also that 
in a South African context judicial avoidance came to the fore through the preference 
showed by the Constitutional Court in its early decisions for slow and incremental 
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doctrinal development.186 In making reference to Ray, Young notes that the South 
African Constitutional Court’s avoidance techniques include the use of the 
reasonableness standard.187 
Fowkes writes that the Grootboom case can generally be understood as an exercise 
in restraint or minimalism.188 Sunstein views is as minimalism and notes that 
minimalism refers to judges who seek to avoid broad rules and abstract theories in 
favour of focusing their attention only on what is necessary to resolve particular 
disputes.189 Sunstein further writes that the minimalist path makes more sense when 
the court is dealing with complex issues which people feel deeply about and on which 
there is disagreement.190 Roux in making reference to Sunstein writes that in the 
Grootboom case the Constitutional Court set out a novel and promising approach to 
judicial protection of socio-economic rights but without mandating protection for each 
person whose socio-economic needs are at risk.191 
Roux argues that in adopting this reasonableness standard, the Constitutional Court 
abdicated its responsibility to enforce socio-economic rights. It can thus be argued that 
through the use of these concepts courts would often make pragmatic decisions which 
took into account the circumstances surrounding a case instead of principled ones 
founded in law which resulted in the litigants in a case having nothing to show from 
the litigation despite having invested so much in approaching a court for relief. 
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Roux in assessing all of this writes that the Constitutional Court has often made 
pragmatic decisions and that the Court does appear to have traded off its duty to do 
justice according to law or make a decision based solely on legal principle against the 
need to manage the impact of its decision on its institutional independence. 192  Roux 
writes further that the adjudicative strategy used by the Constitutional Court in the early 
part of its existence was centred around allowing the court to fulfil its mandate while 
at the same time attempting to reconcile the judges’ commitment to the ideal of 
adjudication according to law with the need to take account of the long-term impact of 
the decision on the Court’s independence.193 Fowkes argues that the Constitutional 
Court has in certain cases strategically elected to avoid doctrine and to instead focus 
on building its institutional capacity. 
Roux and Fowkes both accept the critique as an accurate description of the Court’s 
housing rights jurisprudence, but reject the negative evaluation of the compromise on 
substance which usually accompanies the critique.  
Roux notes that in the initial years of its existence, the Constitutional Court was aware 
that the ANC was likely to be in power for some time and thus knew that it would need 
to make judgments which would not incur the wrath of the ruling party.194 The court 
thus often made use of an adjudicative strategy in order to balance the interests of the 
ruling party with that of the public and in doing so insured that it survived pressure 
being applied from both sides.195  
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Roux argues further that the Court’s reluctance to embrace the minimum core concept 
can be attributed to the Court’s need to strategically negotiate its relationship with the 
other branches of government in order to ensure its survival. If this analysis is correct, 
then the ratification of the ICESCR will not have any significant influence on the 
jurisprudence of the Court, because the Court is institutionally constrained to change 
its doctrinal stance. Not adopting the minimum core approach was essentially a 
survival strategy.  
Roux explains the rejection of the minimum core approach of the ICESCR as the court 
stating that the textual differences between section 26 of the South African 
Constitution and article 11.1 of the ICESCR particularly the qualification of the right to 
access adequate housing, suggests that the real question which must be answered is 
whether the measures taken by the state to realise the right to access adequate 
housing are reasonable.196  
Roux argues that the real reason for the courts objection to the minimum core 
approach had to do with the long-term institutional consequences of adopting this 
understanding of its mandate rather than the absence of adequate information before 
it. The strategy was motivated by managing the courts relationship with the ANC in a 
political context as the ANC was set to govern for some time.197 
Roux starts his analysis of the Grootboom case and the rest of the social rights 
jurisprudence by noting the difference between the positive reaction to the case among 
foreign (mostly USA) scholars and the largely negative reaction of local scholars.198 
Roux suggests that the different reactions is attributable to the fact that the foreign 
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scholars are used to and willing to accept the strategic compromises that constitutional 
courts in transitional societies may be required to make, while South African scholars 
consider such compromises as illegitimate or irrelevant from their doctrinal 
perspective.  
Roux aligns himself with the foreign scholars who are mostly willing to accept the 
strategic compromises that a Constitutional Court, especially those operating in a 
young democracy, are required to make. He writes further that in the case of social 
rights, the court needed to develop a review standard that would allow it to defer to 
other branches of government where necessary.199 
3.5 Conclusion  
The analysis of the jurisprudence however shows that the Constitutional Court has 
been reluctant to engage with and add substantive content to cases involving socio-
economic rights. Moreover, an analysis of the jurisprudence proves Roux’s submission 
that the Constitutional Court that “often the court made pragmatic decisions and that 
the Court does appear to have traded off its duty to do justice according to law against 
the need to manage the impact of its decision on its institutional independence.”200  
Roux writes that from the court’s perspective, the danger was that if the court had 
adopted the minimum core approach, it would have tied the court down to a standard 
of review that was too interventionist and too flexible and that given the political climate 
at the time and the sensitivity of the role of the court, this was something which the 
court wanted to avoid.201 He writes further that however conceptually flawed, the 
court’s rejection of the minimum core standard must be understood in this light.202 
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Fowkes adopts a different perspective and states that what the Constitutional Court 
was doing with its judgments was constitution building as the Constitutional Court 
bears the duty to make the constitution work.203 
This Chapter has thus shown that, despite the court being a forum which must decide 
and rule on disputes, in certain circumstances the Constitutional Court has often made 
pragmatic decisions instead of making strictly principled decisions and that this has 
often left litigants in the same position as they were before they approached the court. 
Moreover, the strategy adopted by the court has left future litigants without any 
substantive content which can be used in future cases around the right to access 
adequate housing.  
The cases examined in this chapter were chosen as they both dealt with questions of 
what constitutes adequacy in a particular right and the ICESCR played a significant 
role in each one. The judgments in both the Grootboom case and the Mazibuko case 
showed a court strongly in favour of the reasonableness standard and also one that 
felt that courts where not the appropriate forum to deal with questions regarding what 
constitutes adequacy. Moreover, in both cases the court dismissed the argument 
made for the adoption of the minimum core standard in favour of the reasonableness 
standard. Fowkes however states that what the court did in the Grootboom case 
amounts to a refusal to articulate content on the facts of the case rather than simply 
reject the minimum core.204 
Choma in commenting on the constitutional enforcement of socio-economic rights 
writes that despite cogent statements from the Constitutional Court concerning the 
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justiciability of socio-economic rights effective remedies for their enforcement remain 
jurisprudentially elusive and problematic.205 Fowkes adds to this and states that the 
election of the court to build its institutional capacity raises the question of whether 
these missed opportunities will present themselves again and if so when.206 Based on 
Muller’s premise, the opportunity has now presented itself with the ratification of the 
ICESCR. 
The judgment specifically in the Grootboom case proves Muller’s premise that the 
Constitutional Court’s interpretation of section 26(1) is different from the international 
law standard. This then raises the question whether the ratification of the ICESCR can 
lead to the Constitutional Court infusing its interpretation of section 26(1) with 
international law and whether the Constitutional Court will be able to sustain its 
interpretive approach post ratification of the ICESCR. In the next Chapter this will be 
tested through proposing various domestic remedies currently available through 
litigation in the domestic courts and examining how this litigation can be conducted 
and what arguments can be made in a post-ratification era. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
THE ROLE AND PLACE OF THE ICESCR IN THE INTERPRETATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 26 OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION 
AFTER RATIFICATION  
4.1 A New Start: The Muller Hypothesis  
Muller, shortly after the ratification of the ICESCR, writes that the ratification of the 
ICESCR by the South African government would make it difficult for the Constitutional 
Court to persist with the view that section 26(1) of the Constitution is distinct from 
article 11(1) of the ICESCR and that post ratification, the time is ripe for the 
Constitutional Court to infuse its interpretative approach of section 26(1) of the 
Constitution with a more rigorous and substantive reading of the section which is 
grounded in international law.207  
In this chapter the provisions of the ICESCR and its supporting documents will be 
tested from a litigation perspective in order to determine whether the ratification of the 
ICESCR can result in the infusion of the interpretive approach which Muller is 
proposing. In this Chapter various domestic remedies which are available to litigants 
post ratification are examined in order to determine what the likely outcome will be 
should these domestic remedies be pursued by litigants in the post ratification era.  
Thereafter, this chapter examines remedies currently available in international and 
continental law in order to determine whether these should be pursued by the South 
African government. The remedies are examined in this chapter in order to answer the 
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question whether the ratification of the ICESCR is enough to ensure the change in 
interpretive approach which Muller foresees or if more needs to be done.  
4.2 The Ratification of the ICESCR and What It Means. 
Article 2(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that ratification is 
an act whereby a state consents to be bound by a treaty and thus the ratification of a 
treaty binds a state on an international level.208 According to article 2(1) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, it is through the ratification that a state establishes 
on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty.209 Therefore, once the 
ICESCR had been ratified, its provisions became binding on South Africa under 
international law.210  
General Comment 9 of the Committee on ESCR provides that domestic law should be 
interpreted as far as possible in a way which conforms to the international legal 
obligations of that member state.211 Thus, when a domestic decision maker is faced 
with a choice between an interpretation of domestic law that would place the state in 
breach of the Covenant and one that would enable the State to comply with the 
Covenant, international law requires the choice of the latter.212 
Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides that “when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, any court, tribunal or forum must consider international 
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law”.213 Section 233 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa ties in with this 
and provides that when interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer a 
reasonable interpretation of the legislation which is consistent with international law 
over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.214 
Therefore while South African courts must consider international law215 the act of 
ratification does not result in a binding agreement and legislative action is required 
before an international agreement can bind the Republic.216 
It then raises the question of whether the ratification of a treaty leads to the provisions 
of that treaty being applicable in domestic law. Section 231(1) of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa provides that “an international agreement binds the 
Republic only after it has been approved by resolution in both the National Assembly 
and the National Council of Provinces. The exception to this rule is found in section 
231(3) where the treaty is of a technical, administrative or executive nature or an 
agreement which does not require ratification. Such a treaty binds the Republic without 
approval in the National Assembly or the National Council of Provinces.217 
This question was answered by the Constitutional Court in Glenister v President of the 
Republic of South Africa.218 In this matter the court held that “the approval of an 
international agreement by the resolution of Parliament does not amount to its 
incorporation into our domestic law.”219 
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The court then went on to state that the ratification of an international agreement by a 
resolution of Parliament cannot just be dismissed as an “ineffectual act” and that 
ratification of an international agreement is a positive statement by Parliament that 
South African will act in accordance with the ratified agreement subject to the 
provisions of the Constitution.220 The court also stated that while international 
conventions are an interpretive aid, this does not give them the status of domestic 
law221 and that for an international agreement to be incorporated into our domestic law 
under section 231(4), our Constitution requires, in addition to the resolution of 
Parliament approving the agreement, further national legislation incorporating it into 
domestic law. This is done either by incorporating the provision of the international 
agreement into the text of an Act, including the agreement in the schedule to a statute 
or enabling legislation by way of a proclamation or notice in the Government 
Gazette.222  
Since its ratification the ICESCR has come before the Constitutional Court in Dladla 
and Another v City of Johannesburg and Others223 and also in Nkwane v Nkwane and 
Others224 in both matters the court noted that it had a duty to consider international 
law. 
4.3 Strategic Litigation 
In Claasen v MEC for Transport and Public Works, Western Cape Provincial 
Department225 it was held that international law has played a somewhat insignificant 
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role in the development of socio-economic rights jurisprudence.226 Post ratification, 
strategic litigation would be the ideal mechanism to use to introduce a new stream of 
litigation around access to adequate housing. As Roa and Klugman write,  
“Strategic litigation creates an opportunity for legal activists and judges to convene 
in a democratic debate around a specific case. Through this process, if there is a 
legal victory, the conditions for implementation will be enabled. However, if there is 
not a victory, the conditions to advance the cause through other avenues will have 
improved, the movement will be stronger and public opinion will be better 
informed.”227 
Strategic litigation is thus described as the bringing of selected cases to court which 
are geared towards achieving a specific goal. These cases are carefully selected and 
are brought to achieve a specific purpose such as testing a particular point of law or 
developing the jurisprudence. Strategic litigation is moreover a method whereby 
litigation is used to set a precedent and to bring about significant changes in the law.228 
Strategic litigation cases can also be used to hold the government to account. It 
achieves this by challenging government policies and procedures which violate either 
human rights or equality standards.  
This type of litigation is not uncommon in South Africa both before and in the years 
since the advent of democracy the courts have dealt with many public interest litigation 
cases brought by organisations such as the Legal Resources Centre, the Centre for 
Applied Legal Studies and the Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South Africa. While 
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in these types of cases, the above mentioned organisations often act for individual 
clients or groups of persons. In many cases the litigants are in fact organisations such 
as the Open Democracy Advice Centre or the Right2Know campaign. An example of 
this is the case of Primedia Broadcasting (A Division of Primedia (Pty) Ltd) and Others 
v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others229  where the Right2Know campaign 
together with Primedia Broadcasting worked together on a case where it was held that 
the rule in Parliament’s Policy on Broadcasting which allowed for the jamming of 
signals where there was disorder in the house was unconstitutional. 
Strategic litigation through the court ties in with the statement made by Viljoen that 
judges must be actively involved in the realisation of socio-economic rights.230 A 
strategic litigation case thus has the potential to benefit many persons who fall within 
the same category as the litigants and in doing so provide access to justice as well as 
access to socio-economic rights to those who are the most in need but who find 
themselves furthest from it.231 
Strategic litigation is thus the ideal mechanism to use to test Muller’s premise as it 
enables litigants to both test a point of law and also hold government to account. The 
need to test a point of law flows from the ratification of the ICESCR creating new 
obligations and the need to hold government to account flows from the duty which 
government has to meet a new international law standard post ratification. 
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4.4 Testing Muller’s Hypothesis Using Domestic Remedies 
The realisation of housing rights and ensuring that everyone has access to adequate 
housing is a complex and layered procedure which has many different aspects and 
requires input from many different parties. Therefore the remedies used and orders 
handed down in such cases should take all these different aspects and interests into 
account and should ensure involvement from all parties to make sure that the 
progressive realisation of the right is achieved. Ideally remedies in cases involving 
housing rights should also make provision for mechanisms aimed at enforcing the right 
to access adequate housing and reporting back after any judgment has been handed 
down and the order has been made.  
Roach writes that socio-economic rights may require more complex remedies such as 
declarations or injunctions that invite or require positive governmental action.232 
Trengove agrees with this and notes that it is indeed a striking feature of the 
Constitution that the courts are given the widest possible powers to develop and forge 
new remedies for the protection of constitutional rights and the enforcement of 
constitutional duties.233 Liebenberg however, warns that to the extent that the courts’ 
remedial approach to constitutional rights is premised on an articulated private law 
model of adjudication, this will limit the willingness of the courts to innovate and design 
remedies best suited for violations of socio-economic rights.234Liebenberg notes 
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further that the provision of appropriate remedies is vital to the effective realisation of 
the rights in the ICESCR.235 
In the remainder of this chapter, domestic remedies are firstly discussed and examined 
to test Muller’s premise. The purpose of the examination of these domestic remedies 
is to determine what effect the ratification of the ICESCR will have on domestic 
remedies and what the likely outcome will be should these remedies be pursued in 
cases involving the right to access adequate housing post ratification. 
  
4.4.1 Application for a Declaratory Order 
Viljoen writes that a declaratory order or a declaration of rights clarifies the legal 
position without placing any obligations onto another party.236 Hoexter notes that a 
declaration of rights or a declaratory order enables a court to make a declaration on 
the rights of the parties or to state the legal position.237 Ebadolahi writes that when 
deciding a constitutional matter, a court must declare any law or conduct which is 
inconsistent with the South African Constitution as being invalid and that such relief 
may include declaratory order.238  
Section 38 of the South African Constitution gives effect to this and provides that any 
person who falls within the scope of paragraphs a – e may approach a competent 
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court in alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed and the court may 
then grant appropriate relief which may include a declaration of rights.239   
In JT Publishing v Minister of Safety and Security240 it was held that a declaratory order 
is a discretionary remedy.241 In Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd242, it was 
held that a declaratory order is a flexible remedy which can assist in clarifying legal 
and constitutional obligations in a manner which promotes the protection and 
enforcement of the Constitution. Du Plessis writes that a declaratory order is a flexible 
remedy which can assist in clarifying issues of law expeditiously and will only find 
application where the issue at hand is purely a question of law or is interlocutory in 
nature.243  
Approaching a court and asking it to make a declaratory order or make a declaration 
on the status of the provisions of the ICESCR after the ratification would be an ideal 
first post ratification step as Liebenberg notes that “a declaratory order stipulates what 
parties obligations are in terms of the law and the Constitution.”244 Therefore through 
making a declaratory order the courts could clarify how the court views the provisions 
of the ICESCR and its supporting documents post-ratification, to what extent the 
provisions are applicable in South African law and also to what extent the government 
is bound to them.  
In selecting in which court the application for a declaratory order must be made, the 
following legislative provisions provide guidance. Section 21(1)(C) of the Superior 
Court Act provides that a High Court may at the instance of any interested person 
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inquire into any existing, future or contingent right or obligation, notwithstanding that 
no consequential relief may be claimed or is claimed by the Applicant.245 This provision 
must be read with section 172 of the South African Constitution which grants the courts 
discretion when framing its orders and allows a court to make an order which is 
prospective.246 Section 19 of the Supreme Court Act also confers upon a High Court 
the power to determine rights or obligations even if a person cannot claim any further 
relief as a consequence of the application.247 An example of this came in the case of 
President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo248 where the court considered the 
validity of the Presidential Act that ordered the release from prison of all mothers who 
had children under 12. In handing down a declaratory order, the majority of the court 
held that the Presidential Act did not violate the right to equality and non-
discrimination.  
In order for a declaratory order to be given, the first requirement which must be met is 
that the applicant must be an interested person or group of persons. Thus, the right 
must attach to the Applicant personally and should not be a not simply be a derivative 
interest.249 This principle was confirmed in Ex Parte Nell250 where the court in handing 
down a declaratory order held that a requirement for the exercise of the court’s 
declaratory jurisdiction are interested parties on whom the order may be binding. 
The second requirement which must be met is that the Applicant must have an interest 
in an existing or future right. This requirements flows from the rule that a court will not 
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decide abstract, academic or hypothetical questions which are unrelated to any 
interest.251 Hoexter writes that while there is no need for an existing dispute, the right 
or obligation in question must not be purely speculative.252 In using either an individual 
or a community who do not have access to adequate housing would meet this 
requirement because the client would have an interest in what would be considered to 
be adequate housing in terms of the new provisions contained in the ICESCR and its 
supporting documents. 
An Application for a declaratory order would be brought by way of an application and 
be instituted by way of a Notice of Motion accompanied by a Founding Affidavit. The 
Notice of Motion will contain the relief prayed for and the Founding Affidavit will set out 
the basis for the case and provide evidence to support the relief being sought. The 
evidence which would have to be presented should include the history of the 
applicants or applicants, their current housing conditions as well as their living 
conditions. As a declaratory order is not made against any particular person or 
organisation the application can be brought by way of an Ex Parte application.253  
The relief sought would be a declaration as to the status of the provisions of the 
ICESCR and its supporting documents, which have been discussed in chapter 2, and 
to what extent they are applicable in South African law. Furthermore, one would also 
seek an order regarding to what extent the government is obliged to comply with the 
standards set out in the ICESCR and its supporting documents. Currie and De Waal 
note that as far as the positive obligations imposed by socio-economic rights are 
concerned, applications for declaratory orders compel the responsible government 
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agency to explain why its policies are reasonable and this has the effect of holding the 
relevant agency accountable.254 This was taken further in Rail Commuters Action 
Group v Transnet Limited t/a Metrorail255 where despite emphasising the benefit of 
declaratory orders the court noted that this remedy enables the court to declare the 
law but leave to the other arms of government the decision of how the law should be 
observed.256 
An obstacle which litigants bringing this application would have to overcome is that 
currently South African courts are only bound to consider international law but it does 
not find direct application. Therefore the likely outcome of such an application would 
be that the court sticks to the jurisprudence and rules that the provisions of the 
ICESCR and its supporting documents must only be considered by domestic courts 
but are not binding on domestic courts.257  
4.4.2 Mandamus or Application to Compel 
A mandatory interdict, also known as a mandamus when it is granted against a public 
authority, is a court order which compels an administrative body to perform a statutory 
duty or to cure a state of affairs.258 This type of interdict orders positive action to be 
taken by a party to remedy a wrongful state of affairs.259 Liebenberg writes that where 
a violation of a socio-economic right exists because of a failure to take particular steps 
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or adopt measures to give effect to a positive duty, a mandatory order may constitute 
appropriate relief.260  
An example where a mandatory interdict was used, is the case of August v Electoral 
Commission.261 In this matter the Constitutional Court ordered that a prisoner’s right 
to vote had been violated by the Electoral Commission in that it had failed to take steps 
to ensure that all prisoners register as voters on the national common voters’ roll. The 
court ordered the Electoral Commission to make arrangements for them to register, 
and once registered, vote in the election.262 
In the Mazibuko case the High Court made use of a mandatory interdict to enforce a 
socio-economic right and furthermore referred to the minimum standard as a 
benchmark for how much water the City was compelled to provide. In this matter, the 
South Gauteng High Court ordered the City of Johannesburg to provide each of the 
applicants and also residents in similar positions as the applicants with a free water 
supply of 50 litres per person per day.263 The High Court judgment in the Mazibuko 
case indicates that a mandatory interdict or a mandamus can be used in a socio-
economic rights context. 
In an access to adequate housing context an application for a mandatory interdict 
would be geared towards compelling the state to firstly provide housing to persons 
who do not have access to any form of housing or compelling the state to improve and 
upgrade existing housing. The application would focus on using the positive 
obligations which have been placed on government by section 26(2) of the 
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Constitution and linking it to the international standard regarding what constitutes 
adequate housing.  
The mandatory interdict will look to compel government to provide housing which is in 
line with the international law standard and where existing housing is not, compel it to 
take steps to ensure that the standard is adhered to.  
An application for a mandatory interdict would have to be brought against both the 
National and Provincial government as Part A of Schedule 4 of the Constitution 
provides that housing is an area of concurrent National and Provincial Legislative 
competence. In cases involving persons in need of emergency housing, local 
government or the relevant municipality would have to be party in the proceedings as 
in the Bluemoonlight case264, it was held that the provision of emergency housing falls 
onto local government.  
Applications for a mandatory interdict or a mandamus must be brought by way of a 
Notice of Motion which will be supported by a Founding Affidavit. As in the application 
for a declaratory order the Notice of Motion will contain the relief claimed and the 
Founding Affidavit will set out the basis for the case and provide evidence to support 
of the relief being sought. 
The two different kind of applications which could be brought are geared towards the 
same goal. Firstly, the application can be brought by persons who do not have access 
to any form of housing and would seek an order compelling the government to provide 
housing to them. Secondly, an application can be brought by persons who do have 
access to housing, but the housing does not meet the standard set out in the 
supporting documents to the ICESCR and would seek an order compelling 
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government to improve these houses and bring them in line with international law 
standard. 
A case where a similar strategy was followed in the case of Mohau Melani and Others 
v City of Johannesburg and Others (hereinafter referred to as the “Slovo Park 
case”).265 While this matter was actually an application for the review of a decision 
taken by the City of Johannesburg to relocate the applicants in order for a housing 
development to be built, it was linked to a failure of the City to make use of the 
Upgrading of Informal Settlements Policy (“UISP”) and instead of forcing the applicants 
to relocate, rather conduct an in situ upgrade of the houses on the property. Thus 
along with applying to have the decision to not use the UISP set aside, the applicants 
also sought an order compelling the upgrading of the property. The applicants argued 
that wherever possible an in situ upgrade must be preferred to relocation.266 
The City opposed the application on the basis that the intended relocation was 
susceptible to development267 and that the decision to not make use of the UISP was 
a policy decision and was thus not susceptible to review.268 The court however 
reviewed and set aside the decision of the City and also compelled them to apply to 
the provincial MEC for funding to upgrade the property in terms of the UISP.  
When bringing an application for an interdict, there are certain common law 
requirements which have to be met. These requirements were confirmed in the matter 
of Setlogelo v Setlogelo269. These requirements are that a prima facie right must be 
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established, that this right has been violated or infringed or is likely to be violated or 
infringed, that the balance of convenience is in favour of the granting of the remedy 
and that there is no other satisfactory remedy available.270  
Applications for mandatory interdicts must be brought in terms of Rule 6 of the Uniform 
Rules of Court and will be brought by way of a Notice of Motion accompanied by an 
affidavit. As the purpose of the application is to compel government to bring existing 
housing up to standard, the Applicant should either be a person who has benefited 
from a government housing scheme or a person or a group of people who do not have 
access to housing. 
In the Founding Affidavit, one would firstly submit that the Applicant has a right to have 
access to adequate housing, then one would set out the living conditions of the 
Applicants and show how housing which the Applicant currently has access to does 
not meet the international law standard. The legal argument which would be made 
would then be that the factual conditions described are not in line with the international 
law standard and that an order should be granted which compels that the international 
law standard be complied with.  
Based on the position previously taken by the Constitutional Court regarding the 
international law standard and section 231(4) of the Constitution, the Applicant will 
struggle to get a domestic court to hand down this type of order. Thus based on the 
current jurisprudence it is unlikely that an application for a mandatory interdict will 
succeed in compelling government to provide adequate housing in line with the 
international law standard. The likely outcome is that the court will simply revert back 
to what it has always done and apply the reasonableness standard. Therefore the 
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ratification of the ICESCR is unlikely to lead to a successful application for a mandatory 
interdict geared to increasing access to adequate housing.   
4.4.3 Application for a Structural Interdict 
Viljoen defines a structural interdict as being a remedy which enables a court to retain 
jurisdiction over a matter with the aim to effectively supervise state actions and ensure 
compliance with the order handed down by the court.271 Ebadolahi describes structural 
interdicts as being a remedy which a court can apply when taking a flexible 
approach.272 Hoexter defines structural interdicts as a mandatory remedy which 
enables a court to retain jurisdiction over a case and supervise the government’s 
compliance with the order handed down by the court over a period of time.273 Roach 
and Budlender state that structural interdicts involve requiring the government to report 
back to the court at regular intervals about the steps taken to comply with the 
constitution and flows from situations where the court fears that there will be non-
compliance with the order."274  
Viljoen writes that the typical elements of a structural interdict include a declaration by 
the court indicating governmental non-compliance with its constitutional obligations, 
an order mandating the state to comply with the Constitution and a duty to produce a 
report stipulating the steps that the government has taken as well as the steps which 
will be taken.275  
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Currie and De Waal note that a structural interdict is a remedy which directs the violator 
to rectify the breach of fundamental rights under the courts supervision276 and that 
from an early stage of the development of our constitutional jurisprudence, the High 
Courts have granted structural interdicts as a form of relief in cases dealing with socio-
economic rights.277 Viljoen in arguing for the use of structural interdicts writes that a 
structural interdict is different from other interdicts. As it can consist of different 
remedial phases over which the court retains jurisdiction to ensure that the state 
complies with its obligations.  
Structural interdicts are an underutilised remedy in South African law as the argument 
is that by making such an order, the court is overstepping the boundaries of the 
separation of powers doctrine. However, a counter argument to this is that through the 
use of structural interdicts, the court is giving effect to the principle of accountability 
and employing a form of checks and balances. As the court held in Pretoria City 
Council v Walker, South African courts have the power to ensure government 
compliance with court orders and that in appropriate cases they should exercise such 
a power if it is necessary to secure compliance with a court order.278 Ling notes that 
the first benefit of the structural interdict is that it allows a court to exercise supervisory 
jurisdiction even after they have handed down judgment and it is this retention of 
jurisdiction that can address the problems of both governments refusing to obey court 
orders and the lack of participation in the deliberation of remedies.279 
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Thus an application for a structural interdict would be the ideal remedy to pursue post 
ratification of the ICESCR to ensure government compliance with its obligations as the 
court would be able to monitor compliance and also issue directives for government 
to report back on the progress made. The application would be brought by way of a 
Notice of Motion accompanied with a Founding Affidavit. The Applicants would need 
to show a continuous failure on the part of the government to act in accordance with 
its obligations and that as a result of this continuous failure on the part of the 
government the Applicant has been prejudiced. It is the continuous failure on the part 
of government which will open the door for the granting of a structural interdict as one 
will be able to argue that because of the continuous failure by government to comply 
with its duties, the court should retain jurisdiction over the case, and order that 
government reports back to the court so as to ensure compliance with the order. 
The matter would then be conducted as follows: after the initial arguments in court, the 
court would issue a declaration as to how the government has infringed its obligations 
and mandate the government to comply with its obligations. The government would 
then be given an opportunity to comply and would be required to present to the court 
a comprehensive report regarding the compliance. A timetable for the government to 
comply will also be set. After perusing the report, the court will give a final order. 
Post ratification of the ICESCR, the application for a structural interdict might face the 
same obstacles as an application for a mandatory interdict, in that the provisions of 
the ICESCR and its supporting documents have not yet been incorporated into 
domestic law and as such it is unlikely that a court hearing the matter will move away 
from the current jurisprudence. In addition to this, Du Plessis writes that the 
Constitutional Court has been somewhat reluctant to grant such supervisory orders as 
they involve the courts becoming involved in day-to-day administrative matters which 
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falls within the executive’s domain.280 However, if the applicants are able to show 
blatant non-compliance this could open the door for the court to hand down a structural 
interdict as the court has previously held, in the Mazibuko case, where the state fails 
to comply, the court will intervene. 
 
4.4.4  Application for Judicial Review 
Viljoen writes that decisions taken by organs of state that relate to section 26(1) and 
(2) of the Constitution are often of an administrative nature as it impacts the rights of  
households and as such these decisions therefore fall under the ambit of 
administrative law principles.281 Viljoen writes further that in the constitutional 
dispensation it is clear that the courts generally have the jurisdiction to oversee state 
actions and all exercise of public power is to some extent justiciable under the 
Constitution.282  
Judicial Review is provided in Rule 53 of the Uniform Rules of Court283 and also in 
section 6 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (hereinafter referred to as “the 
PAJA”).284 Judicial review is a mechanism which develops from constitutional and 
administrative law and operates as a bridge between these two fields of law. While in 
a constitutional law context, judicial review is mainly concerned with the establishment 
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and structuring of a system of government. However in an administrative law context, 
judicial review is primarily concerned with the daily business of government.285 
Innes CJ in Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co v Johannesburg Town 
Council286 held that there were three types of review in the South African legal system 
namely; review of the decisions of inferior courts, common-law review of the decisions 
of administrative authorities and a wider form of statutory review. 
Hoexter describes judicial review in the constitutional law sense as being the power of 
the courts to scrutinise and declare unconstitutional, any type of legislation or state 
conduct that infringes on the rights contained in the Bill of Rights. In the administrative 
law, sense judicial review refers to the power of the courts to scrutinise and set aside 
administrative decisions or rules on the basis of certain grounds of review.287 Section 
6 of the PAJA regulates the judicial review of administrative action and provides that 
a court has the power to judicially review administrative action if the administrator who 
performed the action was not authorised to do so or was biased or is reasonably 
suspected of bias. Further grounds of review include that the action was taken for an 
ulterior purpose or motive or was taken in bad faith. An administrative action which 
consists of a failure to take a decision or an administrative action which is 
unconstitutional or unlawful can also be taken on review. 
An example from case law where this course of action was taken is the Slovo Park 
judgment288. In this matter, the Applicants sought to review, and set aside the refusal 
or failure of the City of Johannesburg to apply to the MEC for Human Settlements for 
funding to upgrade Slovo Park. The Applicants consisted of a group of around 10000 
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people in around 3700 households who were living in an informal settlement. The 
basis of the application stemmed from the failure of the City of Johannesburg to make 
use of the Upgrading of Informal Settlement Policy to ensure the upgrading of the living 
conditions and housing of the Applicants. The court reviewed and set aside the failure 
of the City of Johannesburg to make an application for funding for upgrade Slovo Park 
and compelled them to do so within three months of the date of the order. 
The Slovo Park judgment provides an example of Applicants who did not have access 
to housing or adequate housing making use of judicial review to have a decision or 
conduct which does not ensure the progressive realisation of the right to access 
adequate housing reviewed and set aside. 
Rule 53 of the Uniform Rules of Court provides that all review proceedings shall be 
brought by way of Notice of Motion and that the application should be served on all 
other parties affected.289 The Notice of Motion shall set out the decision or proceedings 
sought to be reviewed and shall be supported by an affidavit which sets out the 
grounds and the facts and circumstances upon which the applicant relies. The 
procedure in applications for review is similar to that of applications in terms of Rule 6 
as the application should still be brought by way of a Notice of Motion, be accompanied 
by a Founding Affidavit and all parties from whom relief is being sought must be joined, 
cited and served in the usual way.290  
Rule 53(1)(b) further provides that the application for review must call upon the 
relevant party to within fifteen days after receipt of the application file with the registrar 
the record of the proceedings sought to be corrected or set aside. The rationale behind 
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this rule by was explained by Kriegler AJA in Jockey Club of South Africa v Forbes291  
where he maintained that not infrequently the private citizen is faced with an 
administrative or quasi-judicial decision adversely affecting his rights, but has no 
access to the record of the relevant proceedings nor any knowledge of the reasons 
founding such decision. Were it not for Rule 53 he would be obliged to launch review 
proceedings in the dark and, depending on the answering affidavit(s) of the 
respondent(s), he could then apply to amend his notice of motion and to supplement 
his founding affidavit. Manifestly the procedure created by Rule 53 is to his advantage 
in that it obviates the delay and expense of an application to amend and provides him 
with access to the record.292 This view was confirmed by Ponnen JA in City of Cape 
Town v South African National Roads Authority Limited and Others where it was held 
that in terms of Rule 53, the right to require the record of the proceedings of a body 
whose decision is taken on review, is primarily intended to operate for the benefit of 
the applicant.293 
In the context of this mini-thesis, the judicial review procedure is ideally suited to 
instances where an organ of state has failed to take a decision which has resulted in 
another party being prejudiced. In a right to access adequate housing context, this 
type of remedy is suited to cases where parties have been on a waiting list for a long 
period of time and a decision regarding them has not been taken, or where the state 
has taken a decision which is detrimental to the housing rights of persons and denies 
them access to adequate housing. An example would be that a housing development 
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excludes certain persons who do not fall into the category of beneficiaries. An 
application can be brought for the decision to be reviewed and possibly set aside. 
As with an application for a structural interdict, the provisions of the ICESCR and its 
supporting documents need not be invoked directly in an application for Judicial 
Review. Rather, the provisions will be used as authority for the argument being made. 
The argument which can be made will be centred on how the decision taken was not 
in line with everyone having a right to access adequate housing and having the right 
to an adequate standard of living. Decisions which violate the rights of person could 
be taken on review on the basis that the decision is not in line with the provisions of 
the ICESCR and its supporting documents. However an application for judicial review 
post ratification will face similar obstacles as the other remedies pursued in this 
chapter and the likely outcome would be that the court would only order the decision 
maker to reconsider its decision. 
4.5 International Law Remedies294 
4.5.1 Ratifying or Acceding to the OP-ICESCR295 
Article 1 of the OP-ICESCR affirms that the Committee on ESCR is competent to 
receive and consider communications related to violations of the rights contained in 
the protocol.296 The OP-ICESCR thus mandates the Committee on ESCR to receive 
complaints from individuals, groups of individuals who have been victims of rights 
violations.297 The OP-ICESCR has thus taken the enforcement of socio-economic 
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rights a step further and created an international law mechanism whereby victims of 
socio-economic rights violations can lodge complaints against member states. Article 
1 of the OP-ICESCR thus provides access to an international law mechanism for 
victims of human rights violations who have not received adequate relief in their own 
country or through their domestic courts. 
The OP-ICESCR is a treaty which promotes a culture of accountability regarding 
compliance with the provisions of the ICESCR and through the creation of the 
mechanism discussed in the above paragraph it empowers vulnerable and 
marginalised groups to lodge individual complaints at the international level regarding 
violations of their socio-economic rights.  Viljoen and Orago write that the OP-ICESCR 
adds important enforcement mechanisms to already accepted standards.298 
In the South African context, the value of acceding to the OP-ICESCR is that the 
jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court has shown that courts have 
been reluctant to give substantive content to the right to access adequate housing and 
in doing so the court has often not given litigants the relief which they sought. Thus an 
examination of the jurisprudence and the examination on domestic remedies above 
indicates that domestically victims of rights violations will only be able to take their 
matter so far. Therefore the complaints mechanism created in terms of the OP-
ICESCR provides a complementary avenue for rights claimants to access justice, 
thereby enhancing the overall realisation of socioeconomic rights.299  
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It is thus crucial that additional international complaints mechanisms are available to 
rights holders as they provide a complementary avenue for access to justice which 
enhances the overall realisation of socio-economic rights.300 Foreman writes that in 
addition to creating an international law enforcement mechanism the OP-ICESCR also 
provides an important source of interpretation which can advance understanding of 
economic, social and cultural rights.301 
Therefore by acceding to the OP-ICESCR, South Africa will enhance the protection of 
socio-economic rights through the provision of further complementary safeguards 
against their violation and thus enhance the social transformation envisaged by the 
1996 Constitution.302 Furthermore, it will provide victims of rights violations with a 
further mechanism from which to seek relief. 
4.5.2 Remedies Available Under the African Charter303  
South Africa signed the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (hereinafter 
referred to as “the African Charter”) on 9 July 1996 and ratified it on the same day. In 
the context of this mini-thesis, it is important to note that the African Charter does not 
specifically recognise a right to housing.304 On 9 June 1999 South Africa signed the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Establishment 
of an African Court on Human and People’s Rights (hereinafter referred to as “the 
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Protocol”) and ratified it on 3 July 2002.305 The Protocol in article 1 establishes 
an African Court on Human and Peoples` Rights (hereinafter referred to as “the 
African Court”). In article 3 the Protocol provides that the jurisdiction of the African 
Court shall extend to all cases and disputes concerning the interpretation and 
application of the African Charter, the Protocol and any other relevant human rights 
instrument which will include the ICESCR.306  
Nalbandian writes that the rationale for the African Court is to strengthen the human 
rights protection system307 and that the African Court has the power to condemn 
violations and order appropriate remedies.308 
In terms of article 5, the African Court can only receive complaints and/or applications 
submitted to it by bodies listed in article 5(1)(a – e).309 The African Court has the 
jurisdiction to hear and decide on requests from state parties and also complaints 
lodged by non-governmental organisations with observer status, individuals and 
groups of individuals.310  
However in order to allow NGO with observer status, individuals or groups of 
individuals access to the court, article 34(6) of the Protocol provides that a State shall 
make a declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive cases under 
article 5 (3) of this Protocol. The Court shall not receive any petition under article 5 (3) 
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involving a State Party which has not made such a declaration.311 Therefore currently 
no South African who has been a victim of a rights violation will be able to access the 
African Court as South Africa has not yet made the necessary declaration. 
The African Court will provide an additional avenue and mechanism for victims of 
rights violations who have not received adequate redress in domestic courts. However, 
before this avenue is available for South Africans, the government would have to pass 
the declaration under article 5(3) accepting the competence of the court to receive 
cases from individuals, groups or NGO’s with observer status. As Hopkins writes, the 
success of the African Court is dependent on the willingness of state to embrace with 
a real sense of obligation the core values of the African human rights system.312 
4.6 Conclusion 
As indicated in this chapter the courts have an important role to play in the enforcement 
and the realisation of the right to access adequate housing. In supporting this 
statement, Fowkes writes that the judiciary has a crucial role with regard to the 
transformation of our society.313 In this chapter it also became clear the cases involving 
housing rights and the right to access adequate housing require unique, thorough and 
well thought through remedies and because of this, the role which the judiciary has to 
play in ensuring the realisation of the right is even more important. 
It was thus important to test whether the ratification of the ICESCR would have any 
affect on the remedies usually pursued by litigants in cases involving housing rights 
and access to adequate housing and if so what the effect would be.  
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The discussion in Chapter 2 above revealed the provisions of the ICESCR and its 
supporting documents will only find application in the domestic courts once it has been 
enacted into national legislation. Thus the provisions of the ICESCR and its supporting 
documents are only an interpretive aid but do not bind domestic courts.314 
As a result of this, this chapter showed that litigants wishing to invoke the provisions 
of the ICESCR and its supporting documents in pursuing domestic remedies to give 
effect to their housing rights and increase access to adequate housing will face an 
uphill battle both in terms of substantive and procedural law. Substantively, the fact 
that the international instruments are currently only an interpretive aid and only need 
to be considered means that any argument made in a court which relies on the 
provisions of the ICESCR and its supporting documents will most likely get to the same 
point as the cases brought before the court before ratification. It is thus unlikely that 
the courts will move away from their current jurisprudence and adopt a new interpretive 
approach. 
In addition to this, litigants will also eventually reach the end of the procedural line and 
will eventually exhaust all forums available to them. Thus the lack of enforcement 
mechanisms currently in place represent a further challenge for litigants as once they 
have reached the apex court and the Constitutional Court rules against them, litigants 
have no further recourse or mechanism available to them to remedy the violation of 
their rights. 
Therefore Muller’s submission that after the ratification of the ICESCR, the time is ripe 
for the Constitutional Court to infuse its interpretation of section 26(1) with international 
law is not as imminent as one would think or as simple as he proposes. As the 
precedent set by the jurisprudence of the court is likely to have more persuasive value 
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than the international law provisions contained in the ICESCR and its supporting 
documents it is likely that the post ratification cases will have the same outcome as 
those brought pre ratification.  
Therefore domestically it is unlikely that the ratification of the ICESCR will have the 
effect which Muller envisions and it is unlikely that the ratification of the ICESCR on its 
own will change the Constitutional Court’s interpretive approach of section 26(1).  
As seen above, the solution to this conundrum lies in the continental and international 
law remedies discussed in this chapter above. By acceding to the OP-ICESCR and 
making the necessary declaration to accept the jurisdiction of the African Court, the 
South African government will provide victims of rights violations and litigants access 
to mechanisms beyond the borders of South Africa. Performing these two acts will 
also solve the current issue of the lack of enforcement mechanisms currently in place 
in that there is no forum which victims of rights violations can access beyond the 
Constitutional Court.  
Granting victims of rights violations access to these forums outside of the borders of 
South Africa will firstly, grant victims of rights violations access to an additional forum 
which can resolve disputes. Furthermore, granting victims of rights violations access 
to these forums will also open the door for a judgment which can be used by future 
litigants as a precedent which can be used to in subsequent cases.315 As Viljoen and 
Orago write acceding the OP-ICESCR will enhance the protection of socio-economic 
rights through the provision of complimentary safeguards against their violation316 and 
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further that these international complaints mechanisms provide a complementary 
avenue for rights claimants to access justice and thereby enhancing the overall 
realisation of socio-economic rights.317 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
CONCLUSION 
In January 2015, the South African government ended a close to 20 year wait when 
they ratified the ICESCR. Through the ratification of the ICESCR, South Africa became 
bound to the provisions of the ICESCR and its supporting documents in international 
law. As indicated above, many in the legal profession view the ratification of the 
ICESCR as a significant step for the realisation of housing and socio-economic rights 
in South Africa. The ratification of the ICESCR is also seen as the South African 
government reaffirming their commitment to the progressive realisation of socio-
economic rights. The ratification of the ICESCR also has the potential to breathe new 
life into and kick start a new wave of litigation around access to adequate housing 
which could have an effect on and could possibly lead to a change in the current 
jurisprudence. 
Muller, shortly after the ratification of the ICESCR, writes that the ratification of the 
ICESCR by the South African government would make it difficult for the Constitutional 
Court to persist with the view that section 26(1) of the Constitution is distinct from 
article 11(1) of the ICESCR and that, post ratification of the ICESCR, the time is ripe 
for the Constitutional Court to infuse its interpretative approach to section 26(1) of the 
Constitution with a more substantive interpretation that is grounded in international 
law.318  
In this mini-thesis, the merit of Muller’s submission was firstly investigated and 
thereafter, this mini-thesis tested whether the ratification of the ICESCR would have 
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Alternative to the reasonableness review model’ (2015) 30 SAPL 71 72.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
100 
 
an effect on the remedies pursued in the courts to determine whether the ratification 
of the ICESCR was enough to lead to the change in the interpretive approach of the 
section 26(1) which Muller foresees or whether more still needs to be done. 
This mini-thesis achieved this by firstly, in chapter two, examining the content which 
has been given to the right to access adequate housing in international law, as well as 
the obligations which are attached to this right. This chapter revealed that in 
international law a minimum core standard applies and that this standard finds 
application when determining what constitutes adequate housing. This chapter also 
examined what monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are currently in place in 
international law to ensure compliance with the provisions of the ICESCR. Chapter 
two also revealed that there are reporting obligations in terms of the ICESCR which 
member states must comply with and that South Africa recently submitted their initial 
report. An examination of this report revealed that access to adequate housing is one 
of the issues which are of concern to the Committee on ESCR and that they indicated 
that more should be done to ensure access to adequate housing. Lastly chapter two 
also revealed that there were additional enforcement mechanisms in international and 
continental law which the South African government should consider implementing 
and the committee also suggested that these mechanisms should be pursued. 
The focus then shifted from international law to South Africa and in chapter three this 
mini-thesis examined what content had been given to the right to access adequate 
housing in South African law before the ratification of the ICESCR. After which cases 
where the ICESCR and its supporting documents played a role were discussed to 
determine what arguments were made in relation to the ICESCR and also how the 
court viewed the ICESCR and its supporting documents. This examination revealed 
that the courts have been reluctant to engage with or directly apply the international 
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law content given to the right to access adequate housing and that the courts have 
also been reluctant to give substantive content to the right to access adequate 
housing. This chapter however revealed that the overriding view is that the 
Constitutional Court has not done enough to add substantive content to socio-
economic rights. This mini-thesis has shown further that Muller is correct in stating that 
as a result of the courts favouring the reasonableness approach, this has led to a 
failure to engage in a substantive analysis of the content of the right of access to 
adequate housing.  However, the reactions from academics such as Roux and Fowkes 
reveal that the court had legitimate reasons for doing so. 
Thereafter, in Chapter four, this mini-thesis tested Muller’s premise from a litigation 
perspective and looked at whether the ICESCR could be used by litigants in pursuing 
domestic remedies which are available post ratification and whether the ratification of 
the ICESCR will bring about a change in the interpretive approach of the Constitutional 
Court of section 26(1). This Chapter, using the mechanism of strategic litigation, took 
the domestic remedies which can be pursued through the courts post ratification and 
examined how the litigation, in pursuance of these remedies, would be conducted and 
would likely to play out in a post ratification era.  
The examination of these remedies showed that the ratification of the ICESCR on its 
own is unlikely to lead to the change in the interpretation of section 26(1) which Muller 
envisions. Chapter four revealed that the fact that the ICESCR cannot be applied 
directly in South African courts means that litigants are not able to invoke the 
provisions of the ICESCR and its supporting documents directly in their arguments. 
Thus the ratification of the ICESCR is unlikely to lead to any major change 
domestically. Furthermore, chapter four also revealed that there is a lack of 
enforcement measures currently in place and that this presents a further obstacle for 
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litigants as the Constitutional Court is the last resort for persons whose rights to access 
adequate housing have been violated 
Therefore, Muller’s statement that post ratification the time is ripe for the Constitutional 
Court to infuse its interpretation of section 26(1) of the Constitution with international 
law is however unfounded as it is clear that the ratification of the ICESCR is not enough 
to ensure that this happens.  
The answer in ensuring the enforcement of the ICESCR and making sure persons get 
the full benefit from the ratification thereof lies in acceding to the OP-ICESCR and 
making the declaration to accept the jurisdiction of the African Court. By performing 
these two acts, the government will provide access to an additional mechanism for 
victims of rights violations who have not received any relief in the domestic courts and 
this will in turn lead to a body of jurisprudence which can be used as precedent by 
future litigants. The Committee on ESCR in its concluding remarks on the initial report 
of South Africa did recommend that government accede to the OP-ICESCR.  
However, while the impact of the ICESCR in domestic litigation might not be seen 
immediately litigation using the ICESCR as a base should still be pursed and cases 
should still be brought post ratification of the ICESCR. As O Regan J noted that while 
the challenges in litigation around socio-economic rights are significant, given the 
benefits it can offer, it should be pursued.319      
A new stream of cases around the right to access adequate housing could also kick-
start the legislature into action and start the legislative process required to enact the 
provisions of the ICESCR and its supporting documents at a domestic level. The 
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benefits of the ratification of the ICESCR will then not been seen in the courts, but will 
still be evident. As Roa and Klugman in writing on strategic litigation state, 
‘If there is a legal victory, the conditions for implementation will be enabled. 
However if there is not a victory, the conditions to advance the cause through 
other avenues will have improved, the movement will be stronger, and public 
opinion better informed. All of these are will recognised factors in the efforts to 
promote social change.’320 
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